
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

FIRST SESSION OF THE DOD HISTORICAL RECORDS DECLASSIFICATION ADVISORY PANEL

Friday, February 23, 1996 0900-1400 hours National Archives Building Reception Room 105



Declassification Program Advisory Committee

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Executive Order 12958, Classified National Security Information, requires automatic declassification of non-exempt historical files over 25 years old. The Department of Defense (DoD) Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel (HRDAP) is established under the Federal Advisory Committee Act as a subcommittee to the Historical Advisory Panel. The HRDAP charter is to recommend information and topic areas that would be valuable to historians and the public. DoD will consider those recommendations for immediate declassification. The HRDAP is chaired by Dr. Alfred Goldberg, OSD Historian; Ms. Rene Davis-Harding, Deputy Director, Security Program Integration, serves as Executive Secretary. Six civilian historians and historians from The Panel will the military services and JCS comprise the panel. meet four times per year. The transcripts for the February 23, 1996 meeting were prepared by a contract transcription service.



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 6000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-6000



JAS MAR 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER

SUBJECT: Panel Minutes

Reference telephone conversation between the undersigned and Gretchen Schlag, DTIC Selections Branch.

Two copies of verbatim transcripts are forwarded for inclusion in the DTIC holdings. The transcripts are from the DoD Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel. This Panel was established by the Secretary of Defense under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). FACA requires open hearings announced in the Federal Register and that meeting minutes be made available for public inspection.

The transcripts are unclassified with unrestricted dissemination. SF Form 298 is attached. For additional information, please contact me at (703) 695-2289.

Assistant Director

Classification Management



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1	
2	PROCEEDINGS
3	0900
4	DR. GOLDBERG: I'll hold my opening remarks
5	until after our welcoming speaker arrives, in about 15
6	minutes. Meanwhile, I think we will start with
7	administrative announcements and by way of one
8	preliminary remark, I'm hoping that this forum will be
9	one of good temper, good humor, good ideas. Ms.
10	Davis administrative notes?
11	MS. DAVIS-HARDING: No, I'll do those.
12	DR. GOLDBERG: Ms. Davis-Harding.
13	MS. DAVIS-HARDING: My name is Rene Davis-
14	Harding. I'm the Executive Secretary for the panel.
15	I'd like to go briefly go over some administrative
16	announcements. All proceedings are going to be
17	recorded, and if you would prefer to be identified by
18	name in the minutes, please state your name clearly
19	before you make your remark, otherwise, you'll be
20	identified as an observer in the minutes.
21	Each panel member has a complete or should
22	have a complete package of information. We sent out

have a complete notebook. If you do not, please get in

several packages of handouts, and each member should

touch with me or Cynthia Kloss on my staff, who will

23

24

1	make sure that you get a complete package.
2	Information from members or observers that
3	you would like to have considered for inclusion, will
4	be considered by the chair for inclusion in the minutes
5	or inclusion for being sent out to the members.
6	Due to limited resources, we unfortunately
7	cannot provide handouts to everyone, but we will
8	attempt to do so. Any submissions for future
9	committee meetings should be provided to Cynthia Kloss
10	from my staff, at least one week prior to the meeting,
11	to make sure that we're able to have those submissions
12	in the meeting packets.
13	On meeting transcripts the verbatim
14	transcripts will be available only on request, and an
15	executive summary will be provided to all panel
16	members, including the military services and the other
17	observers government observers. And any attendees
18	may request a copy of the executive summary through e-
19	mail and the e-mail address is on the bottom of the
20	agenda for today.
21	On refreshments, breaks and other items.
22	Coffee is provided in the rear of the room for
23	everyone, and we ask that you please refrain from
24	moving around during the formal papel deliberations

Breaks will be strictly at the discretion of the chair

1	and restrooms for men and ladies
2	DR. GOLDBERG: You will be permitted to leave
3	for that purpose. You'll have to raise your hands of
4	course.
5	MS. DAVIS-HARDING: The mens' room is at the
6	left, all the way at the end of the hall; and the
7	ladies' room is to your right as you exit, all the way
8	at the end of the hallway.
9	We expect lunch to arrive at approximately
10	11:30 to 11:45, and we're very flexible with the lunch
11	break. It may not extend to 60 minutes that's going
12	to be up to the chair.
13	Telephones are available in the basement of
14	the building. You may use the elevator, and during
15	break, the room phone will be available for outside
16	local calls. We unfortunately, do not have the ability
17	to take phone messages while you're here.
18	And finally, name tags are being provided as
19	a courtesy to the other participants and as a way to
20	identify everyone. That's it.
21	DR. GOLDBERG: We are here because we believe
22	that the government has a special obligation to keep
23	the public informed. It does this by publishing
24	documents, histories, and by giving the citizens access

Indeed, one doesn't even have to be a

25

to its records.

1	citizen to have access to U.S. government records.
2	The enormous growth in government classified
3	documents during the past six decades has confronted us
4	with the complex problem of how to make accessible to
5	the public a maximum number of those records with a
6	minimum of security risk.
7	Ever since World War II a series of Executive
8	Orders have sought to deal with this problem with
9	limited success. The classifiers seem to be able to
10	keep ahead of the declassifiers in some departments.
11	Let me recapitulate where we are coming from.
12	The 1995 Executive Order 12958 provides for automatic
13	declassification of historically valuable records after
14	25 years. But there is a catch in that. It also lists
15	nine areas for exemption from automatic
16	declassification and provides for systematic
17	declassification of historically valuable exempted
18	records.
19	The Executive Order establishes an
20	information security oversight office within the
21	management the Office of Management and Budget to
22	see to the implementation of the Order. This of course
23	is the same office that has been in existence for many
24	years under other agencies. I believe it is going to
25	move into the National Archives building in the near

1 future.

It also establishes — that is the Executive

Order establishes an interagency security appeals panel

composed of senior level officials to decide on appeals

from declassification challenges and appeals for review

of mandatory classification, and to approve, deny or

amend agency exemptions from automatic

declassification.

There's also an information security policy advisory council of seven members, not employees of the government. Its function are to advise the President on policies, recommend changes in policies, recommend to agency heads in the specific subject areas systematic declassification review, to serve as a forum to discuss policy issues and disputes. The Director will provide support to the council.

Unfortunately these two bodies are not yet operating. The members of the council have not yet been appointed, therefore they can't get anywhere. The other body, to my knowledge, has not yet met.

But nevertheless, our panel is part of a larger government-wide apparatus to which DOD is responsible. We're an important part, because DOD has such a large percentage of government record holdings. The last time I was aware of the amount, I think it was

1	something like 27-30 percent of the records in the
2	National Archives by Department of Defense records.
3	In response to the Executive Order, the
4	Department of Defense issued its overall
5	declassification plan in October. The military
6	services select staff at defense agencies which hold
7	most of the records of the Department of Defense have
8	or will issue individual declassification plans. I
9	think some of you may have seen them already.
10	The Secretary of Defense has given
11	responsibility for overseeing DOD declassification to
12	the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command,
13	Control, Communications and Intelligence, known
14	familiarly as C3I. Last winter C3I gave consideration
15	to establishment of a departmental declassification
16	advisory panel, that would include scholars from
17	outside the Department of Defense. The reaction in OSD
18	was favorable.
19	A further impetus to action came from the
20	letter in July to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
21	C3I from a group of scholars, including some of you,
22	suggesting the creation of the liaison committee to
23	advise on desirable priorities for the selection of the
24	Defense Department's records for review and
) E	dealegaification of the new Everytive Order

1	The Assistant Secretary received through
2	Emmet Page, responded with a strong affirmative and
3	arrangements began to establish the panel that would
4	carry out the function.
5	For ease of administration, always a prime
6	consideration in a large bureaucracy DOD is a large
7	one the committee was established as a panel of the
8	Defense Historical Advisory Committee, with C3I
9	providing the administrative apparatus, for which I am
10	profoundly grateful.
11	The charter of the Defense Historical
12	Advisory Committee has been amended to include the
13	Defense Historical Records Advisory Panel. The
14	planning session attended by many of you was held on
15	November the 30th last. It helped clarify some of the
16	problems and issues involved in the establishment and
17	operation of the proposed panel.
18	This brings us to date. This is a panel
19	established by the Department of Defense to help
20	facilitate, we hope, the declassification of DOD
21	records. It has two constituent elements: Chiefs of
22	DOD historical offices and scholars from the academic
23	community. These two represent the two most prolific
24	groups researching defense records.

The Departmental leadership beliefs that

1	informed outside scholars acquainted with government
2	records, and the declassification process, provide a
3	public presence on the panel and can lend expert
4	assistance to the panel's work. The Chiefs of the DOD
5	historical offices and their staffs have authoritative
6	knowledge about many groups of the records.
7	We're fortunate to have available to us also
8	the expert advice of DOD's record managers and
9	archivists of the National Archives and Record
10	Administration. Moreover, we hope to draw on the
11	specialized knowledge of other scholars who are
12	familiar with the bodies of DOD records.
13	The DOD declassification plan issued by C3I
14	calls for declassifying 15 percent of the effective
15	records each year for five years. Estimates of DOD
16	records involved are 500,000,000-plus pages. We
17	emphasize the plus. The Navy and Marine Corps report
18	about 500,000,000 pages on their own, so it's quite
19	possible that we're talking about more than a billion
20	pages of records to look at during the next five years
21	and the number will undoubtedly grow.
22	Fifteen percent of 500,000,000 would be about
23	75,000,000 pages per year, and there may be release of
24	documents by internet or other electronic means.
25	It seems likely that most of the records will

1	be subject to systematic review rather than automatic
2	declassification, because priority during the first
3	year will probably be on the low sensitivity category
4	documents, that is documents with a little classified
5	information. The panel probably opted those efforts to
6	the records of high and medium sensitivity, that is,
7	more highly classified records.
8	Let me remind you that in addition to the
9	normal systematic declassification process, which has
10	been functioning, there are declassification programs
11	in particular areas of high public and political
12	interest. These include the human radiation
13	experiments program, a huge effort across the
14	government in which DOD played a major part; the POW-
15	MIA records; the Gulf War syndrome records, a three or
16	four year effort by the Army; and the Kennedy
17	assassination records and there are a lot of related
18	DOD documents.
19	Let me bring to your attention the existence
20	also of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing
21	government secrecy, established by Public Law 103236 on
22	April 30, 1994 in the Foreign Relations Authorization
23	Act for fiscal years 94 and 95. This 12-member
24	commission includes members from Congress, the
25	executive branch and the public.

1 The Commission's function is to investigate 2 all matters in any way related to any legislation, executive order, regulation, practice or procedure 3 relating to classified information, for granting security clearances, and to submit to Congress a final 5 6 report containing recommendations on the classification of national security information and the granting of 7 security clearances. It had broad powers, including 8 subpoena power, a staff, and funds. 9 It is to make a final report two years after 10 the date of the first meeting, which I understand was 11 12 earlier this year, so we may not get the report in 1997. To the extent that it can help reduce the volume 13 14 of classified materials in the future, it will ease the 15 task of declassification. I think that you are aware of some other road 16 blocks that obstruct the declassification process. 17 problem of foreign government NATO documents will 18 continue to limit access to bodies of records. Getting 19 permission from all the other members of NATO to 20 21 release documents is a lengthy and wearing process. Access to intelligence records, especially secret and 22 23 crypto-materials will continue to be difficult, and of 24 course there are the statutory bands on disclosure or 25 release -- certain prisoner of war information, for

1 instance.

2	The responsibility for providing
3 .	declassification guidance to the various elements of
4	defense belongs to the DOD declassification management
5	panel composed of representatives of the major elements
6	of the department. The two panels, this panel and the
7	declassification management panel, are complementary
8	and should maintain a cooperative relationship. To my
.9	knowledge, that panel has not yet met.
10	The prime purpose of this panel is to
11	determine declassification of bodies of DOD records
12	that would best serve the interest of the public and
13	the scholarly community, and I assume that the two
14	interests are essentially the same. Since the capacity
15	for declassification is limited, we will find it
16	necessary to try to establish some order of priority
17	for declassification.
18	As an advisory panel, we will have to present
19	our findings in the form of recommendations to the
20	Assistant Secretary C3I and the Assistant Secretary of
21	Defense. In the final analysis, each element of the
22	Department engaged in declassification will determine
23	its own priorities. I'm hopeful that with support of
24	officials from the office of the Secretary of Defense,
25	I believe that they intend to be supportive, our

1	recommendations will carry enough weight to influence
2	priorities. I have no doubt that this panel can make
3	some difference.
4	We're all aware of the frustration
5	experienced by many of us in securing access to
6	classified records and in securing declassification
7	records. I have no doubt that we could spend a great
8	deal of time venting our frustrations and prescribing
9	procedures for speedier or large scale
10	declassification. Instead of that, I hope I ask
11	that we adhere to our prescribed function of
12	recommending declassification priorities for which we
13	can offer the strongest support. We will be able to
14	make discernable progress if we stick to our task.
15	As you're all aware, virtually all of the
16	documents with which this panel will be concerned are
17	in the National Archives at its Federal Records Center
18	here at Suitland and elsewhere around the country.
19	We're therefore going to have to do a considerable
20	amount of business with the National Archives and
21	Records Administration. We are fortunate to have a
22	liaison at the Archives for this purpose, Michael Hertz
23	and Jeanne Schauble. Ms. Schauble is present and
24	prepared to represent NARA in our discussions.
25	I'd like at this time to pause and to welcome

1	our welcoming speaker this morning, Mr. Frank Horton.
2	I'm informed that Dr. Horton does not insist on having
3	long biographical details of his career before
4	before presenting himself, so I would like to welcome
5	Mr. Horton who is representing the Assistant Secretary
6	Mr. Page. He's not here yet. Beg pardon?
7	MS. DAVIS-HARDING: He's somewhere in the
8	traffic.
9	DR. GOLDBERG: I thought I saw him. We will
10	dispense with that for the time being and move on. I
11	am interested in hearing from the members of the panel
12	here, as I say, I am hopeful that they brought good
13	ideas. Our goals, as I have indicated, are to, if
14	possible, expand the scope of the records to be
15	declassified, speed up the process if possible, and
16	provide some guidance to the declassifiers by
17	establishing priorities for the kinds of records we
18	would like to see declassified.
19	We're tasked to recommend priorities for
20	declassification, and in recommending priorities we are
21	also in effect bringing about an expansion of the scope
22	of declassification. Speeding up the process will, of
23	course, depend on the resources made available to the
24	job and this is a theme to which we will undoubtedly

return again and again during the course of this

meeting and future meetings, because whatever is going
to be done depend on the resources devoted to doing the
job.

Looking at it from a historical viewpoint, we're all aware that many government programs, whether enjoined by Executive Order or statute often lag behind established target dates. This declassification is especially vulnerable to resource allocation because it is projected on such an enormous level — such a high level. It would take a lot of money and people to carry it out. As I say, we'll probably be coming back to this a number of times during the course of the meeting. We can't overlook it; we have to be aware of it and have to be aware that we can recommend, we can propose that somebody else is going to dispose of these recommendations.

With that I would like to open the meeting to suggestions, comments, from the panel. Mr. Wampler.

DR. WAMPLER: Yes, — on the agenda for discussion which is in the blue package we received — just this last one that puts something up and duly shoot it down, because a sense of how the people within the agencies would like to see the panel interact with them. And what I'm going to put on the record for people to look at was a model which inspired some of us

in proposing this panel in the first place, which was a 1 similar liaison organization that was set up for the 2 3 Department of Energy which worked upon a process which presented information to the outside scholars about the existing retired record groups. Those were the 5 discrete units you were working with. We need to try 6 7 to establish some way to put triage on this -- what are the most important, the most interesting of those 8 record groups to scholars that they would like to see 9 10 us assign a high priority? That to me, seems to make sense in this 11 12 setting, rather than some sort of effort to devise a 13 list of subject priorities which would lead for a search for documents amongst the hundreds of different 14 15 retired record groups amongst all the different 16 services and all the different offices and agencies 17 that we're dealing with here. 18 So it seems that one way to approach this 19 might be a two step process whereby first of all you do 20 try to establish what are your high interest priority 21 That in turn can serve as the subject areas. 22 guidelines by which you then approach the issue of 23 trying to sort through all the various retired records 24 that the different services and offices are trying to 25 deal with here, because that, I assume, is the method

in which they're approaching this. You've got to
return record accessions for the various services and
for DOD. You pull over boxes of those. You don't pull
over cervical cuts or files within boxes spread out
amongst many different accessions.

So we have to find some way to mesh the subject interest of the outside community, the scholars, the public, with the units within which the different offices are dealing and try to come up the ultimate mix of those. Dr. Goldberg said most of this is probably going to be addressed towards records which will probably fall in category 1 or category 2, which present the most promise for you in screening these and also in trying to meet whatever work plan targets that you set down for yourselves.

I made the argument the last time and this time that it seems to me that it doesn't make a great deal of sense to try to backload the process with the most difficult materials, thereby assuring that you're going to not comply, but at least try to establish a learning curve in applying the new guidelines to the category 1 and 2 materials from the start, in some way.

And also it just seems to make sense from a public relations point of view to try to get some of the high interest items out there throughout the entire

•	process, and not have them are be warting towards the
2	end.
3	I provided my own selective list of some of
4	the document collections that I know exist at the
5	National Records Center for record group 330, which has
6	some of the very high-level, high-policy document
7	collections of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
8	or the Office of the Assistant Secretary for National
9	Security Affairs, or the Assistant Secretary for Atomic
10	Energy Affairs for late 50's into the 60's, all of
11	which I would assume fall under the purview of the
12	Executive Order. It would be rather replete with
13	documents of great interest to us. It would also be
14	rather replete with category 1 and category 2
15	documents, and this, I think, is what we'll probably be
16	trying to come to an agreement on. How do we deal with
17	these the very records that are most interesting,
18	the ones that present the most difficulties.
19	That was my idea as far as one way to deal
20	with this. Dr. Goldberg has already mentioned another
21	point which I made, which is the need to have a very
22	close coordination with NARA. I mean if these things
23	get reviewed, declassified, NARA has to be ready to
24	take the hand off because then there's a very large
25	logistical problem on their end. They have to

1	repackage these, get pull sheets put in them, get them
2	ready, and you want to, to the degree possible, to have
3	the least amount of delay from the time DOD or the
4	services are ready to hand off the records, and NARA is
5	ready then to make them available to the public,
6	therefore carrying out the final intent of the
7	Executive Order.
8	That in gist, is what I put down in my much
9.	longer submission, and I'm just curious to see how the
0	people who are on the other side, having to deal with
11	this, feel about that sort of approach, adding input to
2	their decision-making process.
3	DR. GOLDBERG: I'm interesting in hearing
4	from representatives of the services or others in this
5	matter. Yes.
6	MR. DAVIS: Jim Davis from Aerospace museum.
17	I agree to the approach that you've suggested, and that
8	is to identify key offices and advisory groups and
19	organizations within DOD for 47-aught (ph) and
20	regardless of where the records are, simply devote the
21	authority of the declassification effort to those
22	particular records. So for example, within RG-330, the
23	Secretary of Defense, deputy or under secretary of
24	Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Atomic
) F	Energy Cognetary of Defense for International Cognetity

1	Affairs and probably Defense Director of Research and
2	Engineering and then along with that, the various RO
3	advisory bodies starting with the research and
4	development. And then moving over to different DOD
5	components, for example, Secretary of the Air Force,
6	Secretary of the Air Force, a couple of key assistant
7	secretaries of the Air Force, and perhaps scientific
8	advisory bodies and so on and so forth. You simply do
9	that in chronological order.
10	DR. GOLDBERG: You didn't mention the C3I.
11	Speaking of C3I, our speaker has arrived, and I'd like
12	to introduce to you Dr. Frank Horton, principal deputy,
13	Assistant Secretary of C3I. I'll skip the biographical
14	details.
15	DR. HORTON: Thank you, sir. Dr. Goldberg,
16	members of the Board, many of whom I've known in other
17	capacities these past years, distinguished guests,
18	ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for attending the
19	first formal session of the Historical Records
20	Declassification Advisory Panel meeting. Pleased to be
21	able to join you on behalf of Assistant Secretary Page,
22	who is out of town, unfortunately, or else he would
23	have been here, and Secretary Perry.
24	This is indeed a time of change for those of
25	us who work in National Security. Balancing the

1	challenges of the next century with fewer resources
2	forces us in the Department of Defense, to reevaluate
3	how we conduct our business. A vital aspect of that
4	business is protecting our nation's secrets and with
5	respect to this panel, balancing that with supporting
6	the public's right to know.
7	Today's forum is one step towards security
8	(inaudible) this important endeavor. You're here today
9	because of new guidance issued by President Clinton.
10	Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security
11	Information, directs us to establish a comprehensive
12	declassification program. The Order states, and I
13	quote, "Within five years from the date of this Order,
14	all classified information contained in records (1)
15	more than 25 years old and (2) have been determined to
16	have permanent historical value, shall be automatically
17	declassified, whether or not the records have been
18	reviewed."
19	This is our motivation, and in his September
20	5, 1995 memorandum, the Secretary of Defense, Dr.
21	Perry, established this distinguished advisory panel.
22	Our charter is to develop a listing of comparable
23	areas, that from a historical and public perspective,
24	the Department will consider for declassification
25	immediately. The Department of Defense

1	declassification plan also emphasizes the role of this
2	panel. Make no mistake, the Secretary of Defense is
3	committed to making the declassification program a
4	reality.
5	Approximately 18 months ago, I spoke to the
6	National Classification Management Society during their
7	annual training seminar. Part of my speech was to
8	challenge the security community to work from a states-
9	bound in the previous classification management system.
10	For instance, 1982, a system was established to let
11	original classifiers do what he or she had to do to
12	protect information security at all costs. Something
13	went wrong with that system.
14	The declassification provisions for the then
15	Executive Order never did work as intended.
16	Information did not complete a natural evolution cycle
17	of classification, implementation, declassification,
18	and release to the public.
19	Clearer, distinctive guidance directed at
20	those individuals who classify information to identify
21	the date or event that would serve as the
22	declassification benchmark. I have yet to see and I'm
23	sure you have yet to see a document labeled "declassify
24	on cessation of the Cold War."

OADR or Originating Agency Determination

1	Required was designated to be the exception to the
2	declassification rule. In retrospect, OADR became the
3	norm or the rule. It appeared that everything was
4	being classified indefinitely.
5	Compare that environment with today"s.
6	Declassification is a reality. We no longer authorize
7	the use of OADR, eliminating what some would say is the
8	easy way out. Classifiers are held accountable for the
9	full life cycle of the information they generate.
10	Cradle to grave decisions on classification and
I 1	safeguards will be a part of the solution for future
12	generations involved with National Security and
13	historical research.
14	However, today's reality is that there is a
15	monumental vacuum that must be filled in the area of
16	declassification. Many of you on the panel have
17	already found the time to review the Department of
18	Defense's declassification plans. With approximately
19	700,000,000 pages of documents, potentially
20	declassifiable, we do not lack for work. You're
21	exploring technological solutions to assist
22	declassification programs, but in the end, it will be
23	people using their best judgement that will make the
	people ability energy best judgement that will make the

On behalf of Secretaries Page and Perry, I

1	challenge this panel to collectively identify those
2	areas that will produce the largest return for the time
3	and resources invested. The Department of Defense will
4	declassify materials, but the speed and focus of their
5	efforts are open to your recommendations.
6	Finally, some acknowledgements. When
7	Professor Trachtenberg first approached Assistant
8	Secretary Page, my boss, with his offer to establish a
9	liaison committee between Defense and academia, we
10	found a perfect combination of factors to help us turn
11	the tide on the declassification planning process.
12	I wish to extend my sincere appreciation and
13	those above me, to Dr. Trachtenberg for his initiative
14	and those of the remaining scholars on the panel. I
15	would also wish on my own and their behalf, to thank
16	Dr. Goldberg, the Secretary of Defense Historian for
17	agreeing to chair this panel. Dr. Goldberg has been
18	instrumental in assisting us with the many details
19	required in establishing the panel.
20	My staff stands ready to assist all of you in
21	any way possible, to gather the information needed to
22	achieve our mutual objective. In addition to the work
23	of this panel, I am aware that many of you serve on
24	advisory committees for other government agencies.
25	This synergism of activity indicates to me just how

1	aggressive the government is in achieving our
2	collective goal of openness.
3	Some of these recommendations may be
4	difficult to accomplish because of legitimate national
5	security concerns, however, I assure you that all of
6	your recommendations will receive full consideration by
7	the Senior leadership of the Department. Good luck
8	today in your formal session. Thank you, sir.
9	DR. GOLDBERG: Thank you. We've had some
10	interesting proposals presented by Misters Wampler and
11	Davis, which I think are moving in the right direction
12	The question that remains, of course, is how fast can
13	we move in that direction given the usual problems of
14	declassifying, of priorities, et cetera. We must bear
15	in mind that the services and other entities in the
16	Department also have their priorities, and in effect,
17	we are going to be competing with them. If they have
18	dedicated themselves to declassifying 15 percent of
19	hundreds of millions of pages of documents, and they
20	genuinely intend to do so, then I think it likely that
21	they are going to start with those that will be easies
22	to declassify and permit them to reach their goals.
23	So what I am suggesting is that we can go
24	ahead and make these recommendations, but we probably
25	should not expect that they will be carried out

1	expeditiously. It may take time, it probably will take
2	time to do the sort of thing we want done because
3	declassifying highly classified records can take much
4	longer than declassifying the lower level records. I
5	think it's practical considerations of this kind and
6	we're dealing with a very pragmatic situation here
7	not only a matter of money and resources, it's a matter
8	of a lot of different entities within Defense OSD,
9	the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the four services, three
10	departments, 15 agencies all of which have their own
11	programs, their own priorities and varying resources
12	and goals.
13	So we're operating within something of a maze
14	and the problem is going to be, as far as possible, to
15	make our way out of that and get some people in
16	authority to make decisions. I think we will get that,
17	but I don't expect it to be done overnight, and I hope
18	that you won't either. Yes, Mr. Leffler.
19	PROF. LEFFLER: My observation is that there
20	is a great deal of emphasis on on openness, but the
21	initial effort, as I see it in almost all the agencies,
21 22	initial effort, as I see it in almost all the agencies, has been to specify all the records that were exempt

But I would put on the table and follow up on

1	(inaudible) by saying it would be desirable if we could
2	agree to ask for services to identify perhaps for our
3	next meeting three months from now, the top ten
4	priorities that they would suggest to us for
5	declassification amongst the categories enumerated for
6	systematic declassification. That would sort of move
7	us forward to sort of getting into an actual give and
8	take about what what's to be the priorities those
9	records that we all submit to be of greatest value.
10	DR. GOLDBERG: I think that can be done. We
11	have every right to ask for information, and I trust
12	that we will get it. Colonel Ponnwitz?
13	COL. PONNWITZ: I'd like to make one comment
14	on Professor Wampler's memo of 19 February. In your
15	second paragraph you asked about FOIA's information.
16	Now, our service is personnel oriented, so the charge
17	of our FOIA requests are for verification of medical
18	claims that go before the VA and legal issues against -
19	- individual services. So in this light, you wouldn't
20	get the kind of information out of that that you might
21	expect.
22	However, there is on matters that don't apply
23	to those two categories, this may be another approach
24	that we could certainly look at.

DR. WAMPLER: Well, it was just an effort to

ı	try to find at feast a paper traff that is the first
2	cut at public interest, and also a first cut in which
3	returned records have been pulled most often in
4	response to those requests as a way of getting to set
5	some of these priorities. The sense I get after
6	looking at the work plans that these are sort of
7	like (inaudible) plans talk about requirements, and
8	we're coming at this from two different approaches.
9	And how we mesh these two is going to part of what we
10	may butt heads on.
11	Now, what I would like to get down to, as Mel
12	said, is particulars, to get a sense of how the people
13	who are dealing with this what use do they see for
14	this panel? Are we just muddying the waters for them?
15	Are we actually helping them in any way? How can our
16	advice be structured to be of most use to them? I
17	mean, we're trying to mesh some ongoing traffic here,
18	and give some direction to it. Well how do we do that?
19	And I know he doesn't want to jump into this,
20	he's got documents that I want from him, he might get
21	back at me eventually, but Brian do our things on
22	Record Group 330, I mean, do the ideas I'm putting
23	forth in any way make sense for what you're trying to
24	do in terms of your review, or do we just create
25	headaches for you if we try to do this?

1	DR. GOLDBERG: "nat's an appropriate
2	question.
3	MR. KINNEY: (inaudible) if you come up
4	with makes sense to me, anyhow interested in
5	DR. GOLDBERG: It seems to me that following
6	up your remarks, Al, that these plans which have been
7	submitted really give you a handle to start with. They
8	list records that they want to exempt and these
9	presumably not presumably it seems to me are the
10	kind that you are very much interested in, and they
! 1	actually give you then listings of the kinds of things
12	you might want to ask for, and give priority to. Did
13	that occur to you?
14	PROF. LEFFLER: Well, it occurs to me
15	that's what we got into discussion about, right now
16	it's simply an enumerated list of those documents that
17	are going to be automatically declassified. Sure, I
18	mean, but most of these of subject oriented categories,
19	which would create impossible barriers for orderly
20	declassification. You need, as Bob Wampler said, you
21	need to do it by accession groups in order to make it
22	reasonable. So you need to identify the accession
23	groups. I think Bob has put it in a very reasonable
24	way, within the category of the OCRG-230 that
) F	porhans we can agree on contain dategories of that

1	sort, depending on Air Force and Army et cetera as
2	well.
3	DR. GOLDBERG: You mean specific accessions
4	within the record groups?
5	PROF. LEFFLER: Yes.
6	DR. GOLDBERG: Not the record groups as such?
7	PROF. LEFFLER: Right.
8	MR. DAVIS: What as it stands now are
9	the parameters in category 3 of the various DOD
10	components? And what sort of effort required to review
11	those to see if they would be automatically
12	declassified? The reason I ask this question is for
13	example, if category 3 records of the Department of the
14	Navy include let's say, bureau of medicine and surgery
15	records in RG-52, it would seem to me that it would be
16	more constructive to spend or to devote the reviewer's
17	time to let's say, reviewing C&O records or ECNO
18	records or something along those lines.
19	This of course, lowers the potential numbers
20	of records that would be automatically declassified,
21	but as I understand it, there's such limited resources
22	in the declassification area, I think (inaudible).
23	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I'd like to make some
24	comments about the general problem. The first point is
25	that I don't think the historians on the panel should

1	be viewed as simply the advocates of opening up as much
2	sensitive material as possible. I think our
3	fundamental approach is adversarial in that sense. We
4	all have a common problem here that's the problem of
5	striking a balance. What's the balance between the
6	need to have a rational declassification system
7	because the present system, I believe everybody agrees
.8	doesn't serve anybody's interest and the need which
9	I think, historians by and large recognize, to make
10	sure that certain kinds of material are innocuous.
11	What can we do? We could offer advice, but
12	in order for that advice to be effective, it has to be
13	targeted on real issues. It's up to the agencies to
14	come to us in a more specific way and say, where should
15	we allocate our priorities? Here's the list of
16	different possibilities. Here are the different
17	series. This is what's inside such and such a series.
18	Where do you think the emphasis should be placed? This
19	is this is this means that we have to move
20	eventually to getting a list of holdings that are being
21	you know, they're excepted from automatic
22	declassification but they're being
23	declassification so that we can have some meaningful
24	input.
25	Until that's done, what can we do? What

Until that's done, what can we do? What

1 should we talk about today? Well, there are certain 2 principles of a general nature that we could, I think, 3 agree upon, that should possibly guide the -- the people who are actually doing the declassification work in their efforts. And the principle that occurred to 5 me -- and I think most of the academic historians would 6 7 agree with this -- is that there is a basic cluster of 8 issues that we are very interested in, and which we do 9 not believe would seriously, or in any significant way, 10 compromise legitimate national security interests. 11 What are these issues? Not things like 12 weapon design or any kinds of nuts and bolts things -you know, details of intelligence gathering or anything 13 like that. We're interested at the top of the policy 14 15 process. High policy. High strategy. Fundamental 16 issues that bear on the core of the story. Issues of 17 medicine; issues of what are you going to do if you 18 have a particular problem like -- you know, Soviets' cutting off access to Berlin to take a particular case 19 20 that a lot of us are interested in? How does this 21 relate to fundamental strategy for the defense of 22 Europe? How much independent authority do military 23 commanders have? What can we say about the strategy 24 making process? To what extent do parochial service 25 interest bear on the final decisions that are made?

1 Issues relating to the control of nuclear weapons, to 2 the sharing nuclear weapons with allies.

All those kinds of issues of a conceptual

nature. There's no reason to keep those things a

secret. And that's where the efforts should be

targeted, in my view. Not — not all these kinds of

technical things which do not bear on questions of hard

policy.

How does this relate to the whole question of how should the declassifiers allocate their efforts?

There's a fundamental tension, it seems to me, between the requirements of the Executive Order and what the historians are interested in. The Executive Order says you've got to declassify X percent of documents by such and such a date — and that means that there's an incentive for the declassifier as to concentrate on the documents that are of least interest, frankly. The things that are least sensitive and nobody cares about — this is the stuff that they're going to be releasing first.

To my surprise and delight, a number of the agencies said that they were going to concentrate on the most sensitive stuff — not that this is going to be released first, but that this is where their efforts were going to be allocated.

1	Now, we all know that's bureaucratic process
2	to a certain degree and the requirements of the
3	Executive Order have to be respected, but in terms of
4	the internal allocation of efforts within the agencies,
5	it would make sense, I think, to say that a certain
6	percentage of time, a certain percentage of that
7	effort, should be devoted to the areas of greatest
8	interest, not the sorts of things that are going to
9	compromise, you know, the legitimate national security
10	interests, but the sorts of things that historians in
11	the public as a whole, I believe, would be interested
12	in, and will give us insight into what was going on in
13	that period.
14	One final point. It was mentioned that we
15	have to worry about foreign governments about the NATO
16	documents and so on. When we think about the whole
17	issue, how can historians help, just here in an
18	advisory capacity? We can only do what people ask us
19	to do.
20	How can we help? One of the ways we can help
21	is a number of us have worked in foreign archives. We
22	know what the British are releasing and the
23	declassifiers should come to us and say, well, we're a
24	little leery about releasing these kinds of sensitive
25	documents that bear on NATO strategy in the 50's, but

1	what do you get on this stuff from European sources?
2	And I can say, well, I saw such and such in the British
3	archives, French archives they're releasing this and
4	that, NATO itself has been declassifying documents just
5	very, very recently through MC14 Section 3 NATO's
6	documents have been coming out. It's that sort of give
7	and take interaction, based on the sense that we're
8	involved in a common process. And we're here to help
9	each other that I think should form our basic
10	approach to these issues.
11	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, I am gratified that the
12	panel members the academic members of this panel
13	have given as much thought to this problem as they have
14	and I hope you will continue in the future. I hope the
15	kind of interaction that you were talking about can
16	it really take place? I know that you're all very busy
17	people. There's always the question, how much time can
18	you devote how much time will you devote to this
19	sort of thing. This is the practical problem; it's
20	another one of the pragmatic considerations which seems
21	to me may be overriding in the whole process. Ernest?
22	PROF. MAY: I just wanted to ask a question
23	on this. Suppose that we were to recommend that
24	Assistant Secretary Page that agrees to an order of
25	priority based on Bob Wampler's list. Suppose that he

1	said that one of the the NFC files should have top
2	priority. Then what happens? What's the actual
3	procedure by which suppose that Secretary Page
4	agreed to this and then what?
5	DR. GOLDBERG: That's a good question. It's
6	a question of how much attention the services and
7	others will pay to what Secretary Page says. He cannot
8	he can tell them what he would like to see done; he
9	cannot enforce the doing of it. They have their own
10	priorities; they have their own resources; they have
11	their own plans. And as you heard and you well know,
12	orders coming from (inaudible) are not always
13	observed sometimes in the breach. So we don't'
14	really know.
15	On the other hand, we can certainly make the
16	recommendations; we can urge OSD to put out a request
17	or establish a priority, and then if we can do some
18	policing thereafter, fine, but I wouldn't guarantee it.
19	MS. DAVIS-HARDING: If I could add to that.
20	I could maybe go over the mechanical process that we
21	envision, using the listing as an example. Once the
22	panel here comes to an agreement on the priorities on
23	that listing, we would then formally shoot it out to
24	the DOD declassification management panel members who
25	are comprised of all of the services and DOD agencies,

1	for comment, and give them maybe 30 days to coordinate
2	that within their agencies and get us an official
3	position on whether they feel that all or some or none
4	of those topical areas or records should be
5	declassified.
6	At that point, once we get the responses back
7	from all of the agencies, then we would consolidate
8	that information and come up with any issues where
9	individual agencies non-concur in release of
10	information, and then we would go through a process of
11	raising the issue to the senior leadership within the
12	Office of the Secretary of Defense to make sure that
13	the senior leadership makes a DOD-wide decision on
14	whether something should be released.
15	For example, if to pick on the Navy if
16	the Navy said nonconcur in release of a particular
17	topic and the DOD leadership felt that it was in the
18	best interest of the Department to release that
19	information, then the senior leadership within the
20	department would override the Navy decision.
21	So the process would be a a process that
22	would take into account all of the comments from all
23	the DOD agencies on each one of the topical areas
24	suggested, and then we would, through that process, get
25	the get a decision from senior leadership. And we

1	could also envision at some point maybe calling in some
2	of the historians or/and some of the dissenting
3	agencies to justify why the information should not be
4	declassified.
5	DR. GOLDBERG: This should give you some
6	notion as to why it takes a long time to get things
7	done. Dr. Horton?
8	DR. HORTON: If I could just something before
9	I have to depart for another activity what Renee is
10	describing, I would characterize as an attempt to
11	develop a consensus from those who ultimately, as the
12	doctor indicated, have the power to accept or reject
13	that our recommendations. We are coming to what I
14	might characterize as the first mid-term, and whatever
15	the outcomes of the election, those who are in the
16	permanent government have a tendency, as we all know,
17	to sometimes treat those who are at the end of a term
18	as lame ducks.
19	So if you really want this to be done and
20	carried on into the next four years and beyond, what
21	you've got to do is get involvement of players and
22	their concurrence their buy-in, so the method that
23	we create here now carries on to the end of this
24	century and beyond. So that's what we're about once
25	we get these recommendations is to get that consensus,

1	get that buy-in, get that commitment of all players
2	throughout the bureaucracy. Thanks again to the panel
3	for a green search. Good to see all of you.
4	PROF. LEFFLER: Could I just make one
5	observation before you leave? It might be very
6	difficult, as you say, a very cumbersome bureaucratic
7	process to get all the agencies to agree, and as Dr.
8	Goldberg said, to actually get them to comply. But I
9"	would suggest that it would be a wonderful thing for
10	OSD itself to set an example with its own records,
11	because if you're talking about those that are of
12	greatest historical interest in terms of foreign
13	policy, people in OSD have the opportunity to set a
14	model for everybody, and I would encourage you to do
15	so.
16	DR. HORTON: That's a fair challenge. I
17	think we'll get arrested if (inaudible)
18	(laughter)
19	DR. GOLDBERG: Better stick around for four
20	more years.
21	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Can I just make a
22	comment? In terms of the procedure. It seems to me
23	that what we should do and I'm curious to get other
24	people's reaction to this is ask the different
25	agencies to come in with their way brow their fair

1	descriptions of what their holdings are, what the
2	contents of their holdings are so that we can give this
3	kind of input. We can ask them for presentations and
4	then we could make our comments.
5	In the plans that went out, there was a great
6	variation, you know, in terms of what was said of
7	how the holdings were described. If you look at the
8	Air Force plan, it's like their description of their
9	files there that are except from immediate
10	declassification or automatic declassification like
11	whole record groups. Or they can't even give that,
12	they just give the numbers. You can't give any input
13	when that's all you're getting. You have to get it in
14	so that there's some content to it, not file by file,
15	but series.
16	DR. GOLDBERG: That's a preliminary step that
17	could take a very long time though.
18	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well then then what
19	are we supposed to do?
20	PROF. LEFFLER: We could at least identify
21	ten priorities that we think are really important; come
22	in describe them and just talk about them. I think
23	trying to describe everything is too much, but to
24	identify a few and to come in and talk and make some
25	decisions is perfectly possible.

1	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: They knew what our
2	general priorities are and on the basis of our general
3	priorities, let them operationalize it in terms of plan
4	for which specific files they're going to work on.
5	DR. GOLDBERG: So you would make as a first
6	step establishment of general priorities, rather than
7	specific ones and ask the services to come back and if
8	possible, particularize what might be made available.
9	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: So that we can discuss
10	it.
11	PROF. LEFFLER: Actually, I think the type of
12	thing that Bob did for the OSD papers is what I'd like
13	to see done for some of the other agencies to
14	enumerate some of that. I mean that gives you some
15	concrete notion of what we're talking about. So for to
16	be too general is a way for us to sort of eviscerate
17	our ability to do anything. So I would focus on
18	getting some real enumeration of high priority files,
19	record groups, within the general category, and to
20	describe them for us and then let us let us have the
21	input so that we can make our recommendations.
22	DR. GOLDBERG: Start with a single agency.
23	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Can I just ask Bob how
24	he got that RG-30 list?
25	DR. WAMPLER: Okay.

7	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Because now do we know
2	those are the most important things.
3	DR. WAMPLER: I said that these are
4	illustrative of a much longer list, and this is my
5	first selfish opinion of some things I think are
6	important. Suitland, the National Records Center
7	you've got files and files and files of these things
8	called From 135s, which are turned over to Suitland
9	whenever an agency retires records there for storage,
0	pending either destruction or transfer to the National
1	Archives.
2	OSD, DOD, has got some very detailed
3	inventories of these. Also they've got a pretty good
4	data base, computerized. You should be able to give
5	them, let's say a time frame, and they can turn out for
6	you, at least line item entries with accession numbers
7	and the number of boxes that are say, in record group
8	330 and also for some of the other services.
9	Now anything you've kept within your own
20	storage, I would imagine the JCS records at Ft. Ritchel
21	or elsewhere they don't have any information on
22	those yet because you haven't really transferred them,
23	have you?
24	OBSERVER: Some.
25	DR. WAMPLER: But you can get a first cut, at

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1	least, at the size of the problem, and you can get a
2	listing that gives you the title, the dates, and how
3	many boxes, and probably the location. And you can
4	work from that and that would be the sort of
5	information DOE had to work with. I mean, I just spent
6	days going through the records out there, taking notes
7	on what was available as part of other projects I'm
8	working on, and I just culled this from a much, much
9	longer list of everything that at least chronologically
10	would fall in the purview of the Executive Order.
11	Now, the question I have you were talking
12	about mechanics here logistics and resource
13	allocation. Now you can fiddle around with your work
14	plant on the basis of what we put forth in terms of our
15	interests. I wonder how much wiggle room you're going
16	to have, in terms of shifting your work plan, and then
17	how much leeway do you think you've got in terms of the
18	guidelines that are being developed by the new
19	Executive Order for declassification?
20	I think we need more of a dialogue here than
21	we can in an open session, over you know, when you
22	get down to the nuts and bolts of really doing this,
23	you know, how much leeway do you really feel you have?
24	I mean if we kick in something on an issue where you
25	feel that under the law, under the guidelines, you're

- just going to look at it and say no, no, no, no.
- We need to know that. We need to feel if we're kicking
- 3 something at you that you really have no flexibility on
- 4 it at all, in order to make this process work.
- 5 DR. GOLDBERG: Brian Kinney handles
- 6 declassification for OSD. How do you respond to that,
- 7 Brian? What would happen if you had to -- somebody had
- 8 to go through all the accessions?
- 9 MR. KINNEY: Well, I don't quite understand
- 10 the question, but as I said before, I think you all
- 11 have a good approach here and for Brian Kinney -- and
- 12 I'm the one who does the declassification for OSD, and
- 13 I've prepared a statement which I'd like to read at
- 14 this point.
- 15 DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, and after you finish
- 16 we'll take a break.
- 17 MR. KINNEY: But it will give you a feel for
- 18 what's involved here. I feel very responsible for OSD
- 19 records and I have a list -- I'm going to read this
- because I don't want to leave anything out.
- DR. GOLDBERG: I think this is appropriate in
- view of the turn the discussion has taken.
- MR. KINNEY: I have but a small staff of four
- 24 personnel that has been performing systematic
- 25 declassification review for the Office of the Secretary

of Defense since 1980. They've gone through most boxes of records from what accessions were at the Suitland Record Center for the years 1947-63. We're working on the 60-63 time frame when the new Executive Order came out.

Of those records we have declassified much and have extended a portion of them — I'm not quite sure what the percentage — maybe ten percent we extended. Our effort during the life of the office has always had to conform to the strictures of records management procedures and live with the fact that there's a significant percentage of other agency material interfiled with OSD records.

Often people get OSD mixed up with DOD and I want to make it clear that we're responsible for the Office of the Secretary of Defense records, not the DOD records.

We began operating under the rules of the new Executive Order on October 14, 1995 in an effort to (1) make forward progress during the transition, and (2) to see how the new rules would affect our review. We began this work despite slowly, evolving implementing guidance that is still not in place, despite the fact that Secretary Perry on behalf of the entire DOD asked for and was granted a six month extension to name the

1	files he proposed for exemption, despite the fact that
2	there was obviously no immediate recommendations from
3	the Herdal this committee or the information
4	security policy advisory council mandated by the
5	Executive Order.
6	Our experience during the last several months
7	has been that we've had to make numerous changes to our
8	procedures, and with assistance still evolving, we know
9	we still need to be flexible to respond to future
10	changes and further changes.
11	We eagerly await the implementing guidance
12	most affecting us and to see what we will ultimately be
13	reviewing when things sort out. So that in a nutshell
14	is where I am and I hope it partially answers the
15	question. We we're ready to do whatever and you all
16	come up with priorities that you want to see worked on,
17	we'll be happy to respond and try to do it.
18	However, I do have a small staff, as I
19	emphasized, and if somebody comes up with something
20	a bunch of war planning information or whatever that
21	they want to see declassified, we'll have to prioritize
22	things because there are certain things that I know
23	that I can't declassify and there's certain things that
2.4	will beg me down to a grandatill. And I want to go

forward and review as much as I can. So -- that's

about all I had to say on it. 1 2 DR. GOLDBERG: So at the very least, you would be prepared to respond --3 MR. KINNEY: Sure. 4 DR. GOLDBERG: -- to any list of priorities 5 that this panel submitted to you and give us some 6 7 explanation of what's involved in reviewing. 8 MR. KINNEY: Right. MR. NORRIS: I'm Robert Norris. T'm a 9 10 participant in the DOE advisory experience, and I'd 11 just like to relate a concrete way of approaching this. This is where Bob Wampler started with with his model 12 13 of doing things. And also Professor Trachtenberg, he 14 makes the point that we can't do anything unless we know what's there and need a concrete list of things, 15 16 which is what happened int the DOE experience. 17 A small group, maybe 15 or 20 people who 18 participated, were given I think about 30 record 19 groups, dates and what they contained, and basically we 20 were told and voted on and after collating those different votes, a certain half dozen or eight rose to 21 22 the top as the ones thai this group decided were the 23 ones that should be attacked first, and they were 24 attacked first, and that is the way we're proceeding

right now. But we wouldn't have known what was there

1	without the presentation of the documents.
2	Now, DOD is much larger situation, and it's
3	OSD and the services and on and on and on. But I think
4	for the mechanics, the logistics of the thing, it is
5	going to have to be a presentation from the different
6	offices of what's available before you can proceed to
7	identify as a panel here what should go first.
8	DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, suppose we take a ten
9	minute break now.
10	(Whereupon, a brief period off the record
11	ensued.)
12	DR. GOLDBERG: In order to better record the
13	proceedings of this meeting, will those of you in the
14	audience please stand when you are speaking, it will be
15	easier to get your remarks and make certain that they
16	can appear in the transcript? Ponnwitz?
17	COL. PONNWITZ: Yes, I'd like to make one
18	comment an observation, really. You know, as the
19	only uniformed representative here from a service, I'm
20	pretty familiar with the kind of records we hold and
21	we have our chief archivist Fred Graboske here who's
22	going to make a comment after I do.
23	What when we look at Dr. Wampler's list,
24	we don't really hold, as a service, a lot of these
25	policy decision matters. We hold contingency plans; we

hold operational records; we hold the kinds of things
that are derived from these policy decisions. Our
fifteen percent, then, can focus to certain operations
that were derivatives of these policy decisions that
may help, but they're not going to answer the questions
you want.

The priorities you have here really take the fifteen percent and dump the majority of that fifteen percent to OSD, the higher levels of the Department of Defense, where if you want that information from them on these policy matters, they have to do the majority of the work first. Unfortunately, that's not the way the system is structured with resources to support this effort. We all have our own archivist; we all have our own archival records; we all have our own fifteen percent of the resource that we can contribute — and it's going to be at our level because we can only declassify the records that we originated. We can't declassify a record that OSD has originated.

So there's a little bit of a conflict here between the way the priorities are going to be structured, and the way the resources are allocated. In the Persian Gulf Syndrome declassification effort, there was sufficient resources allocated to change the structure. We got money to do that. With this effort,

1	we don't. We can only use the resources that are
2	currently available to us now.
3	Now Fred Graboske, our chief archivist, would
4	like to add a suggestion, and I would ask him to do
5	that at this time.
6	MR. GRABOSKE: Well, first let me kind of put
7	things in perspective for you and that calls for
8	both the Executive Order implementation and the Gulf
9	War. The Department of Defense is spending, I would
10	guess, \$10,000,000 this year on the declassification of
11	about 20,000,000 pages. There is not one penny
12	budgeted for the billion pages we have to declassify
13	under the Executive Order. So we really have a
14	resource problem. And so I'd like to comment on the
15	suggestions I've heard about us providing a list of
16	what we consider the priorities to be declassified.
17	If you ask us to do that, you're taking our
18	time away from declassification. Let me kind of turn
19	the tables on you and suggest that you do some
20	research. Go to the National Archives or the National
21	Records Center, get copies of the 0-1 reports, the
22	computer printouts from every record group held in
23	classified stacks stacks one, two, and three.
24	They're done by record group and it was every accession
25	in those record groups. If you see something that

1	strikes your interest, go on out to the record center
2	and look at the Standard From 135 that lists all the
3	folder titles in every box in that particular
4	accession. Then come back to us and say, hey, you know
5	RG-127, which is the Marine Corps records, and this
6	particular accession 65-8599, boxes 42 through 49 look
7	like they're really interesting. Could you focus on
8	those?
9	And if you tell us that, you're more than
10	likely to get a positive response, because we're making
11	our plans to five years, and if you tell us right up
12	front what you're interested in, specifically by
13	accession and boxes, then maybe we can devote our
14	resources to those particular boxes and get them to you
15	quickly.
16	I see Cuban Missile Crisis is one of your
17	particular interests. Okay, those records have been
18	declassified all our records from the Cuban Missile
19	Crisis have already been declassified. We're waiting
20	to ship them to the Kennedy Assassination Records
21	Review Board which has demanded them. That's one of
22	the problems demands for our resources. So as soon
23	as we finish that, we'll retire the records to the
24	National Archives and you can go look at them there.
25	But you know, that's my suggestions.

1 .	DR. GOLDBERG: How extensive are your
2	accession list? How long would it take to go through
3	an accession list for the Marine Corps. It may be even
4	longer for the other services, but how about the Marine
5	Corps?
6	MR. GRABOSKE: Our accession lists comprise
7	13 binders that's about 4,000,000 pages, several
8	hundred accessions. It covers materials from World War
9	II through mid-eighties. It would take you a little
10	bit of time, but if you would just start with the 0-1
11	reports, computer generated by the records center
12	which by record 127 look at RG-127, look at the list
13	of accessions, some you're not going to be interested
14	in. Files in general (inaudible) 1950-52 you're
15	probably not much interested in.
16	But the operation records, the war diaries,
17	the command diaries that were generated back three,
18	four years from World War II through 1964 when the
19	series changed those are in the record center. You
20	can find those in several different accessions. If
21	you're interested in them, go to the SF-135 or come to
22	my archive and look at the SF-135s, and we can get
23	stuff declassified for you.
24	DR. GOLDBERG: Do you think it would be
25	useful to have representatives of the major elements of

1	the services, OSD and JCS give us here, perhaps at our
2	next meeting, a notion of what you have. People here
3	have been asking for inventories, for lists, et cetera.
4	I know that is a near-impossibility, but would it be
5	possible to get the essence of the sort of thing you
6	have, especially at the levels in which people here are
7	interested in this information?
8	MR. GRABOSKE: I would suggest the National
9	Archives could do that. This is a joint effort between
10	us and the National Archives. The 0-1 reports are
11	generated by the Washington National Records Center.
12	DR. GOLDBERG: MS. Schauble?
13	MS. SCHAUBLE: Yes, I'd like to make a
14	comment on that. The Washington National Records
15	Center holds a majority, I guess, of the records that
16	are still in the agency custody. These 0-1 reports are
17	going to be very extensive, not only that, but not all
18	the records that will be in the records center are yet
19	scheduled as to whether they are permanent or not. And
20	of course we could only be focusing on permanent
21	records for the purposes of this Executive Order.
22	I produced a list of all the classified
23	series that have been accessioned in the National
24	Archives, and that comes out to something like four
25	inches of paper and I don't think that's as much as

ı	are actually in the records center.
2	DR. GOLDBERG: How did you get it down to
3	four inches?
4	MS. SCHAUBLE: Small print. I would be happy
5	to work with you in as a liaison with the records
6	center. I'm not sure that the center is really set up
7	to provide access to the committee members to their
8	records of 135s and so on. I would also say that as
9	part of our moving to our new building, a lot of those
10	records that are in the records center that had been
11	scheduled for accessioning by the archives through 1995
l Ž	and the accessioning had been postponed for various
13	reasons, are being moved into the archives now.
1 4	As a matter of fact, as we speak, we are in
15	the process of bringing some of those records in. That
16	creates a bit of a problem for this group because
17	they're going off the record center rolls and onto
18	mine, so to speak, and there's going to be a period of
19	transition while I get them into my database and get
20	figured out as to what exactly we have.
21	So, I would suggest that in terms of in
22	those terms, you might want to work with me as a
23	liaison with the records center.
24	DR. GOLDBERG: How close to date is that
25	accessioning now? In general?

1	MS. SCHAUBLE: We are going to still be
2	moving records probably through about the middle of
3	April, and at that point we would have brought in
4	everything that the agencies have agreed for us to
5	bring in at this time.
6	DR. GOLDBERG: How far is that going to make
7	you set beyond?
8	MS. SCHAUBLE: Some of it most of it
9	probably is within the time period of this Executive
10	Order. Some of it may go a bit beyond. Whether it
11	would cover everything in the center that is subject to
12	the Order, I don't know, because as I say, it's only
13	what the agencies have actually agreed for us to take
14	at this point.
15	DR. GOLDBERG: Thank you. Ms. Smith? We are
16	hearing now here from the Presidential Libraries, an
17	area, I think that most scholars are very much
18	interested in, and one which certainly holds high level
19	policy materials. Would you stand, please?
20	MS. SMITH: Yes. I don't want to feel like
21	I'm beating a dead horse with this group, but in
22	November, I went over the fact that the Presidential
23	Libraries do hold a small group of high level policy
24	papers that we come under the Executive Order. The
25	archivist is entrusted with the declassification of

1	those materials, and we would really like this group to
2	consider some way of attacking the 7,000,000-plus
3	classified materials in the Presidential Libraries.
4	In December, the archivist sent out a plan to
5	each one of the intelligence groups for proposing
6	250,000 items at three libraries dealing with Viet-Nam
7	and Eastern Europe they're from the National
8	Security files, so they sort of go with Dr. Wampler's
9	idea, but they also they're from a file, but they
10	also deal with the subject. They would be easy to
11	declassify; they're extremely high policy level. As
12	yet we really have not gotten any feed-back from you
13	all in terms of how you want to respond to that plan.
14	The archivist said that we're more than
15	willing to listen to something else. If you want to
16	attack the 80,000 at Truman the 80,000 classified
17	items at Truman, the 250,000 at Eisenhower and do a
18	whole Presidential collection, we can go that way, but
19	we really really want this group in some way to
20	attack the high policy level materials at the
21	Presidential Libraries have and in some way address
22	those so that the archivist can comply with the
23	Executive Order and get something declassified in the
24	first year dealing with Presidential papers.
25	Of course, they have multiple equities,

1	involve coordination. NARA, the Presidential Libraries
2	will have to coordinate multiple decisions, but we are
3	interested in working with you all in any way we can to
4	address this. We have sent each one of the
5	intelligence agencies specific planning aids they're
6	much larger than the four inches that Jeanne is talking
7	about we couldn't get it down in as small a print.
8	But I think we can give this group any more specific
9	knowledge that they want, if there are other ways they
10	want to go, but we'd just like to be part of your
11	consideration.
12	MS. DAVIS-HARDING: That was sent to the
13	intelligence community? Did you send it to
14	MS. SMITH: Pardon?
15	MS. DAVIS-HARDING: The listing your
16	listing your recommended listing?
17	MS. SMITH: Who did we send it to?
18	MS. DAVIS-HARDING: Yes.
19	MS. SMITH: Well, I'd have the copies because
20	it seems it's one interesting thing to me is that
21	every intelligence meeting I've been to, the agencies
22	keep telling me I haven't sent it to them, but I sent
23	it to Dave Whitman at OSD you want me to go through
24	all the different names?
25	MS. DAVIS-HARDING: No, that name's in my

1 office. 2 MS. SMITH: My office is right next door and I have each different person in the military that I 3 sent it to -- Rich Warshot (ph), CIA -- you want me to 5 keep going? MS. DAVIS-HARDING: 6 No --So that plan has gone out. 7 MS. SMITH: 8 PROF. LEFFLER: Have you had any responses? 9 MS. SMITH: The one response that we have, 10 and I was telling Dr. Trachtenberg about it, is that 11 CIA is proposing to the various intelligence 12 communities a way of dealing with presidential papers, 13 and this is a proposal which is to scan presidential 14 papers, put them on an optical disk -- the agency would bring them back, and then we would -- they would be 15 involved in transferring equities to other agencies and 16 17 the libraries would coordinate the declassification 18 decisions. And that plan would involve the other 19 intelligence agencies buying into it. 20 We've had several meetings on it. It is still at the talking stage. NARA's feeling on that 21 plan is we're more than willing to listen. 22 23 preservation concerns of that screening, but certainly 24 the agency has indicated to us that they're more than

willing to cooperate with that. And several of the

agencies have indicated interest because it's working 1 out cheaper to do that sort of plan and buy into that, 2 than it would be to do onsite review. 3 I really don't care. We just want to see something declassified, and if the plan works and the 5 preservation of the documents is good -- and I think 6 CIA is willing to work with that -- with us on that -we will be more than cooperative. 8 We believed onsite review of the Presidential 9 Libraries was the way to go and we've had a few 10 situations with onsite reviews that worked extremely 11 Iran Contra sat over at the OJ and amazingly 12 well. 13 enough, the reviewers from the different agencies were 14 given the authority to make a review decision on Iran 15 Contra documents, so we know it can work. But if it's too expensive to go to 16 17 Presidential Libraries, then this other proposal is a real option. What we have proposed is that they do the 18 250,000 or small number of items the first year so that 19 20 we can see if the technology is really working, and 21 they have come back and said maybe one library would be 22 better than three different libraries because we 23 proposed collections in Kennedy, Johnson, and Ford. So we said, okay, we'll up it at Johnson which has the 24

largest amount we're proposing for the first year and a

1	larger staff, in this particular case, to deal with it.
2	So that is now the only real discussion
3	that's going on right now that I've been involved in
4	in terms of some response on this issue. And I've also
5	heard a lot of we know you're out there Presidential
6	papers contain multiple equities, you're too expensive
7	to visit, and we'll deal with you at four and a half
8	years.
9	DR. GOLDBERG: As an aside if we observe that
10	all of you will speak up as well as Ms. Smith does, you
11	won't have to stand.
12	MS. SMITH: That's why I did not stand.
13	DR. GOLDBERG: You did very well. Are the
14	Presidential Libraries willing and capable of doing
15	this?
16	MS. SMITH: We really want to do this. We do
17	not have large staffs, but it is extremely expensive to
18	maintain the classification on our documents which are
19	over 25 years old, and we believe that what we proposed
20	are 80-85 percent documents that you all will
21	declassify, and that will make researchers happy, like
22	Professor Trachtenberg. So, yes.
23	You know, are we going to have problems in
24	terms of our resources in coordinating four
25	sometimes four different decisions which as no surprise

to you all, may not match up at all? Well, we've been 1 2 doing it for years. It's on a much larger scale. There will be some time lag from the time we get the 3 documents back to coordinating it, but we will make our best effort. 5 DR. GOLDBERG: Well, it seems to me that this 6 panel would certainly welcome what you propose and 7 support it and perhaps help provide some guidance. 8 Is -- we probably couldn't get to any high level of 9 policy, and if we could relate it to OSD, perhaps JCS, 10 I think we certainly would have the highest levels and 11 12 perhaps we ought to think in terms of some kind of a 13 pilot project, initially, which you give us some notion 14 of what is possible and what is not possible to be I'd like to hear some reactions. 15 16 DR. CLARKE: I'd like to -- the Marine archivist pointed out that as soon as you get into 17 scanning redaction -- declassification right on a 18 19 scanning document, that gets extremely expensive. you really have money to --20 21 MS. SMITH: Let me make it very clear. 22 is not the one who is proposing this scanning proposal. 23 The CIA is the one who is proposing and has come to NARA and put this on the table, and they are the ones 24

who seem to have the money to implement this proposal.

1	What we are saying as an agency is we're more than
2	willing to work with you and listen to a possible
3	alternative. And they feel they have the when you
4	look at going out and doing onsite review, and the fact
5	that DOD wants to look at every presidential paper that
6	is security classified, if you're doing that if you
7	can't implement the Executive Order without looking at
8	every one of our 7,000,000 pages, then probably
9	scanning is the less expensive proposition than doing
10	onsite interagency
11	DR. CLARKE: The CIA would establish a
12	scanning center, say
13	MS. SMITH: Yes.
14	DR. CLARKE: at the presidential library
15	that other agencies could
16	MS. SMITH: They would go to the libraries to
17	scan, come back here, and then what we were talking
18	about at the last group meeting was that agencies could
19	either if they buy into this and I am not the CIA
20	spokesperson here, I'm just telling you of a plan
21	you could either go out to where the redaction center
22	is or they would give you diskettes that would have,
23	say, all the Truman classified presidential papers on
24	that diskette. It is still in the talking stage, but -
25	_

1	BG. ARMSTRONG: Let me I'm Dave Armstrong,
2	I'm a Historian. I am not an archivist, and I think,
3	quite honestly, that's one of the problems this group
4	is having. Because if we're talking about archival
5	matters, it takes an archivist to talk knowledgeably
6	about the nuts and bolts of doing things in an archive.
7	It seems to me that what the historical
8	the academic historical community wants and what the
9	archival bureaucracy the people who have to do the
10	declassification are capable of producing is
11	we're not making connection between what Professor
12	Leffler wants and what the Marine Corps is saying. And
13	I would suggest that that connection can only be made
14	if the academic community Dr. Wampler, whoever
15	the individuals in it who are interested in the
16	particular set of records, whether they're OSD, JCS or
17	some service records, contact the archival people
18	responsible for those sets of records and find out what
19	is the nature of the general descriptive listings that
20	those people keep, and then work from there to specify
21	amongst those listings, what particularly they would
22	like to see first in the queue for declassification.
23	I'm emphasizing archivists, as they've
24	repeatedly said, they have a problem. They have a 15
25	percent mandate to do. Period. And they have to do

1	that. And so what you're asking for which is perfectly
2	reasonable from my point of view as a historian, has to
3	be matched up with this mandate and they have
4	workloads to juggle and so forth.

I'm very serious about suggesting to the historical community — what has to be done is a lot of work, quite frankly, on the part of the historians who are interested in access to particular records. This is like telling a graduate student and go out, like Bill Holly did to me 30 years ago, threw me in the archives and basically said, you know, go in there and find where this information is. And until you od that, I don't think you're going to be able to make a connection between what you want in terms of getting your interests first in the declassification queue and what the people charged with doing the work are capable of doing.

Now, I would be perfectly happy to get the Joint Staffs people, the documents people, here next time to talk to you about JCS records. They have gone through systematic declassification up through '63, and I believe they are now accession — those records are available or at least positioned in the National Archives.

Since that time the records sit out at Fort

1	Ritchie. Now, those records, there is a degree of
2	specificity about what's in those files. The JCS
3	files up to 1986 or so were very carefully organized
4	because of the idiosyncracies of the organization. And
5	we can get you that kind of information, I think.
6	But I would simply try to emphasize to you
7	that as historians, you're used to dealing with the
8	specific, and the problems you face here are specific,
9	and they're idiosyncratic to each organizational set of
10	records, and I really do think that trying to get this
11	group to establish sort of general priorities I
12	don't think you're going to make the connection between
13	what you want and the people who actually do the work.
14	DR. DUDLEY: Now if I would endorse what
15	Dr. Armstrong is saying, and my concern as representing
16	the Naval History Center and Naval history in general,
17	is that the impact of a different set of priorities on
18	top of our capabilities our capabilities are very
19	strained, very limited in terms of declassification.
20	The initial burden of Desert Storm declassification
21	program, which is immediate, and which is dealing with
22	events that only three four or five years ago is
23	going to consume us for a while, at least at the center
24	and with regards to some other particular locations.

The Navy system for declassification is

decentralized. Each location has a very limited number 1 of people who can work this problem, so I see that there's a potential tension here, existing tension, 3 which may be relaxed -- and I'm certainly willing to listen to priorities coming from the academic side. 5 In order to be a little more specific, 6 7 though, I'd like to ask Mike Brown from the C&O's Information Security Oversight Team, to make a 8 statement. 9 DR. GOLDBERG: Will you also ask him to stand 10 11 up, please? 12 DR. DUDLEY: I will do that. 13 I am in a position of making a MR. BROWN: security profession here. I am neither a historian or 14 an archivist by profession. But I've dealt with 15 16 declassification as an issue for many years. 17 submitted our declassification plan and we got the requisite blessing on it -- they said we did very 18 19 well -- good plan. That's what we were striving for. 20 We have a plan. We haven't finished that 21 plan. We haven't identified a series of exempt records 22 yet. We have begun a process, and this process has 23 been ongoing, well, since June. In taking this 24 decentralized process and trying to bring those records

in together and determine how they're going to achieve

1	their part of the 15 percent and that's the goal.
2	That's the goal that they're striving for. And this is
3	the kind of information that you're probably not
4	interested in, because we're going to have the people
5	in NAFC (ph) looking at what they can declassify in
6	1950's technology on weapons systems.
7	Similarly, for the people who do aircraft.
8	They're going to be looking at the technology of
9	aircraft. They're not looking at political decisions.
10	They're not looking at procurement decisions. Those
11	are by and large declassified by now, anyway.
12	So they're approaching this thing in a in
13	a very narrow focus, which is the only way that they
14	can do it they can't start looking at broader
15	spectrum they have to concentrate on their area of
16	responsibility.
17	Resources, Desert Storm, POW-MIA and the
18	other directed efforts. We have a dilemma here, in our
19	need to do, to comply with the Executive Order
20	requirement. And we also have some directed actions
21	come down from the Secretary of Defense that said,
22	we'll concentrate on doing this and okay, we'll have to
23	bring all our resources if we start concentrating on
24	those efforts. We still have some other things to do.
25	I think that our plan that we put together

I think that our plan that we put together

1	was a pretty good plan. At a meeting we held yesterday
2	that Dr. Dudley attended mechanic went over all
3	these things. Ray Schmidt who had been probably
4	described in very great detail what's contained in
5	records or what's not identified. I asked the group at
6	large (1), has the declassification factory turned out
7	anything yet. And the answer is no. Not a single
8	product has rolled off the assembly line. (2) Can you
9	target a subject if we give you a subject to go after?
10	The overall response was no.
11	Now, again, I'm not a historian. I'm not an
12	archivist. So I'm not that familiar with the
13	precision, the specificity, that the records are
14	identified by means of the 135 and other depictions.
15	But what I have seen is that they are very, very
16	generalized kinds of things, so all you can do is focus
17	on the records of an activity, for a time point, and
18	not target a subject.
19	DR. GOLDBERG: I think that what you
20	indicated is that this panel would probably not be
21	interested initially in giving priority to some of the
22	things that you mentioned.
23	MR. BROWN: Exactly.
24	DR. GOLDBERG: That said of the agencies,

would you imagine this panel would be interested in the

1	Navy and the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, the
2	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, that's
3	different. This is where policy is made, and this is
4	where the focus of this panel will probably be in
5	establishing priorities. Did you want to say
6	something?
7	PROF. LEFFLER: Did I want to say something?
8	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.
9	PROF. LEFFLER: Not right now, thanks.
10	DR. GOLDBERG: I thought I saw you yes.
11	MR. DAVIS: I accept the invitation to review
12	planning aides in 105 at the National Archives and 135s
13	in the record center. But there's a gap here, and that
14	is there's very little information available to the
15	public on holdings still in the physical custody of DOD
16	components. For example, the Army Intelligence and
17	Security Commands, per its handouts last November
18	listed about 7000 feet of records, but to the best of
19	my knowledge, there's no information publicly available
20	on the dates of these records, classification status,
21	types of records and so on and so forth.
22	And that's, I think, something that needs to
23	be addressed, because at this point the public, for the
24	most part, can determine what's in the National Archive
25	system, what's in the record center system, but cannot

- determine what records are still in physical custody of 1 2 these various DOD components. 3 And I think if the panel can identify in specific offices and organizations' records that are of interest, that will greatly assist in the 5 identification of specific collections -- let's take 6 for example, two or three entries in the record group in the National Archives of 100 or 125 accessions in 8 some record group at the record center. But without 10 that focus, it's -- I wouldn't say an impossible task, but an overwhelming task. 11 So, for example, if the focus wants to be --12 13 focuses on the outset on OSD records, that greatly 14 narrows the search. 15 DR. GOLDBERG: I think this is probably the 16 disposition of the panel, to focus on particular 17
- offices and organizations. It seems to me that the nub of all of this is how do we start here? Do we want to 18 19 explore first and find out more about what is there? 20 What are the things that we're interested in that we find out about? And then do something about it. Or do 21 22 we want to start with some kind of a pilot project and 23 say these are subjects that we would like to see looked 24 at, given priority in the records of: the Office of the 25 Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and

especially the Presidential Libraries? These are the 1 2 kinds of decisions you have to make. 3 Today, do we want to make up a list of recommendations and in priority order, and say this is 4 what we would like to see done, and then forward it up 5 6 the line and wait to hear from it? Or do we want to find out more about what is there and what the 7 procedures are and what the possibilities are? 8 This 9 involves having some knowledge of where our 10 recommendations go and what might happen to them. I, personally, think it would be a good idea 11 12 for some of us to establish direct relations with some 13 of the offices and organizations that we'd like to see declassifying specific areas that we might prescribe or 14 15 ask for, would be more accurate. I'd like your reaction to this. Are we prepared to make some 16 17 specific recommendations at this point or do we want to 18 make some further preparations and explorations so that we may have a much better informed proposal to make at 19 20 the next meeting or at the one after that? 21 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well I like the idea of 22 a pilot project because first of all, it enables us to focus in on the issues that are at least the crowning 23 concerns of the historians, plus also, in the process 24

of working out a pilot project, we'd be able to come to

grips with all kinds of general problems that are going to be faced throughout the whole effort. And the whole idea on focusing on OSD, Presidential Libraries, JCS, makes sense for obvious reasons.

The other thing I was going to say is I think 5 it's great to hear from archivists saying, you know, 6 come talk with us and tell us what your priorities are, 7 something very easy that we can do along those lines. 8 9 I think, get the names, addresses and phone numbers of 10 the relevant contact people that can be disseminated to practicing historians because we -- in terms of our own 11 12 work -- are a very small proportion of a very large 13 profession, and it would be very nice to kind of get 14 this information out so that people can go through the process that you outlined and speak with you. Because 15 16 you know, it's a very big bureaucracy; it's very hard 17 to kind of target the right people, and people get frustrated. 18

And I can say also that there is a certain variation in terms of how receptive different archivists are. Your attitude, I thought, was wonderful, but I can tell you that that's not what we encounter on a uniform basis. Sometimes it's quite frustrating. So just going through the process of identifying people who are receptive would be of

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So that's on the one hand. 1 enormous value. 2 The other hand is proceeding with a pilot 3 project of the sort of thing Al Goldberg just described. Here the question is how to proceed? 4 5 DR. GOLDBERG: That's what I wrote down. 6 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: And there are at least 7 two basic choices, you know. Who is going to take the 8 lead? We can go your route -- historians can go and 9 get these forms and so on and say this is where we 10 think priority emphasis should be placed. 11 My own preference would be to kind of go the 12 other way and have a presentation, kind of giving a 13 general description of the holdings, and then a general 14 philosophy of where efforts are going to be 15 concentrated, and then -- and then open issues. 16 are the specifics where we would like you to give us 17 Here is some typical problems of a concrete advice. Tell us -- tell us -- you know, give us some 18 nature. 19 sort of feedback. This is our inclination, or this is 20 an open issue -- but the -- but instead of asking the 21 historians to kind of go and do this work, I think it 22 would be much more efficient to have the main thinking 23 going on among the archivists who then would have 24 specific problems in mind that they could just come to us with, and then our advice would fall on prepared 25

1	ears.
2	COL. PONNWITZ: Just remember we're still
3	plodding along with our fifteen percent, and each day
4	we do another percentage of that 15 percent, whether we
5	get guidance or not. To come any time that we have
6	to pull the archivist off his task to come up with
7	these problems and everything else to educate the
8	panel, is part of that 15 percent that doesn't get
9	done. And we're not going to be our compliance with
10	the Executive Order says do 15 percent.
11	Now we hope that eventually we'll get the
12	right 15 percent, but for the services, from what I'm
13	hearing here, anything we tell you is not going to
14	satisfy what you want anyway because we just don't have
15	it.
16	Now the other agencies perhaps do, and maybe
17	if you focus on the prime agencies first that you want
18	information from in that order, the higher level
19	government agencies, and certainly the suggestion that
20	the CIA has for the Presidential Libraries is excellent
21	for that kind of policy, we cannot scan all the
22	information we have, nor would we want to because it's
23	not economically possible for us, nor would it help you

But I think if we set the priorities in

get any data that you particularly need.

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1	certain categories and don't burden everybody with the
2	same priority determination, we'll get to the thing,
3	the conclusion, you want a lot quicker, a lot more
4	efficiently.
5	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I don't want to burden
6	people. I think that these people who have been
7	working with this problem they know what the
8	problems are. They can come in with scarcely any
9	preparation at all and give a presentation just the wa
10	any of us can on the basis of what our current work is
11	and then then it would provide a framework for
12	interaction.
13	The and that's why focusing on OSD, JCS
14	makes sense.
15	DR. GOLDBERG: You are aware that marines
16	carry out orders better than anybody else.
17	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: We don't give orders.
18	DR. GOLDBERG: I'm not talking about our
19	orders, the ones they already have.
20	PROF. LEFFLER: I want to endorse what Mark
21	Trachtenberg said. I think that we should focus on
22	three things: First, carrying out a plan for the
23	Presidential Libraries and underscoring the importance
24	of grappling with those materials because they're
25	clearly the ones that least ostensibly relate to

1	high policy.
2	And secondly, focusing on the Office of the
3	Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I
4	think that's a very good beginning.
5	And these allusions to you know, making a
6	preparation for us and taking away from 15 percent,
7	don't strike me as terribly persuasive because what
8	we're asking for is a presentation that should take
9	somebody sort of two hours to prepare. We want a sort
10	of some type of survey of what you, who deal with
11	the records, think are the most important record groups
12	that deal with high policy making and what are the
13	particular problems that might inhere in the
14	declassification of those documents.
15	To those of you who have spent years and
16	years working with these records, it doesn't seem to me
17	that this should be a voluminous assignment. It's
18	something that we want to hear your best judgement on
19	so you can inform us so that you can then go ahead and
20	declassify these very records that you are most
21	interested in.
22	So I think that's a very good way to proceed.
23	DR. GOLDBERG: It depends on whose most
24	interesting your most interest does not necessarily
25	mean that the declassifier's are. But on the subject

1	of Presidential Libraries, would you be interested in
2	visiting some of them?
3	PROF. LEFFLER: No, I have been to almost all
4	of them. I don't need to go back to them.
5	DR. GOLDBERG: No, for this purpose, to find
6	out what it is that ought to be declassified.
7	PROF. LEFFLER: Well
8	DR. GOLDBERG: Or any other panel members
9	interested in such visits?
10	MS. SMITH: Well, I mean we're more than
11	willing to have onsite visits, but I think that we have
12	we can provide this group with very good knowledge
13	if I know what you all want. We have provided what we
l 4	think is the most sensible plan which deals with
15	VietNam and Eastern Europe and national security files
16	of the Kennedy, Johnson and Ford libraries. I can give
17	you the breakdowns for Truman, Eisenhower. I can tell
18	you what they have. We can write back to you if you
19	wanted this at one of the libraries, that's great too.
30	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: About the the general
21	philosophy of how to do this. It doesn't make sense to
22	start with the oldest stuff first and then just kind of
23	move forward the oldest stuff systematically so we
24	get the sense of an inexorable tide sweeping its way

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through the --

1	MS. SMITH: Well, there was a method to our
2	madness. We sort of thought that too. In our plan, by
3	the way, we have the Hoover library which is 22,000
4	classified materials and also contains a bunch of Louis
5	Straus's files he was chair of the Atomic Energy
6	Commission and those materials would largely be
7	exempt from declassification.
8	But basically, we picked the three libraries
9	we did and the sublibraries we did because the
10	Eisenhower library have some duplicative material that
11	the National Archives has, that we are hopeful will get
12	declassified and so were trying to prevent the agencies
13	from doing duplicative declassification efforts. So we
14	were staggering the Eisenhower library, hoping that the
15	declassification effort would be done in the office of
16	the National Archives material and then we would do
17	Eisenhower the second year.
18	The Truman library we could start out at the
19	Truman library; the Johnson library, one reason we
20	picked the Johnson library, it has 150,000 items held
21	out for VietNam and Eastern Europe. They're already
22	segregated; they're very ready for review and we have
23	had huge research interest in VietNam, Soviet Europe
24	and Eastern European countries. So then the Ford
25	library said, well we're very ready and the Kennedy

library said we're very ready on this issue, and it was 1 sort of like we were getting feedback to respond to Dr. 2 Goldberg in terms of how we could best serve the 3 declassifiers to be sure that their time was wisely 4 5 used. But we can go -- if you want to go with the 6 older libraries, we can do Eisenhower and Truman. 7 mean we're very flexible. We too, have a resource 8 component, so we were figuring that into our plan too 9 as to where we would be most ready. 10 11 DR. GOLDBERG: You have already proposed a Now what can this panel do to complement that, 12 to support it, to add to it, perhaps? 13 Well, I think that maybe someone 14 MS. SMITH: from the panel should be involved in this group that 15 Ray and several of the other of us in the room are 16 17 involved in with the CIA in terms of optical scanning. I think that might be interesting to see if -- if that 18 19 is the way to go. That would be one thing I would 20 suggest. 21 Another thing is that the group endorse the 22 plan, if you agree with the plan, and try to put 23 resources in terms of doing the plan in those three libraries. I think that DOD has already indicated its 24 25 agreement with the CIA scanning proposal. I don't know

1	exactly.
2	DR. GOLDBERG: Can we add subjects and
3	establish priorities?
4	MS. SMITH: Yes, you can add subjects. You
5	can but all I'm saying is I don't think it takes a
6	visit to a Presidential Library, because you tell me
7	the subjects and I can go out to the libraries and get
8	you the information back. I can get you detailed
9	lists, searches, whatever.
10	You can have libraries, if you or some one
11	wanted to go older, we could go older. We were just
12	holding it out for certain reasons.
13	DR. WAMPLER: Essentially your work plan is
14	based on their data base and DOD equity documents that
15	have been pulled from the accession records in each of
16	the libraries?
17	MS. SMITH: These were very, very ready
18	materials and we we proposed for several different
19	reasons research interest, readiness, and the
20	likelihood that most of the stuff would be
21	declassified, wouldn't be exempt from declassification.
22	So that was why we pulled these areas Eastern
23	Europe, it's changed; VietNam, it's changed. We know
24	from what we're sending in on inventory review that
25	we're getting a high rate of declassification on these

1 areas, and we have tremendous amount of research 2 interest. But we're more than flexible. If this group wants to go some other way, you all just need to tell 3 me what you want me to give you lists on and I can 4 5 pretty much give you the list. DR. WAMPLER: Is it organized according to 6 7 the way it is in the libraries? I mean --MS. SMITH: Yes. 8 DR. WAMPLER: -- you know, DDL you would have 9 wide read files, or you would have the staff files --10 11 DOD ---MS. SMITH: No, the wide read files, the 12 13 Presidential files are organized somewhat differently, 14 because they really reflect the Office of the 15 President. 16 DR. WAMPLER: That's what I mean. They're 17 organized on those --MS. SMITH: Most of what we're proposing are 18 19 national security files that deal with countries --20 national security country file for VietNam at all three 21 libraries, then the key national security staffers that 22 dealt with those issues and Eastern Europe. So that's what we're proposing from those. 23 24 DR. WAMPLER: What would be most useful to

you then, would ---

1	MS. SMITH: Pardon?
2	DR. WAMPLER: What would be most useful to
3	you is if we accept the chronological progression would
4	be to see whether we want to endorse or play around
5	with the priorities you set within each library for
6	dealing with the files or records. That could be done
7	pretty easily on the basis of what you have here, I
8	would say.
9	MS. SMITH: It doesn't it's not very
10	helpful for my review to say you're interested in DOD
11	materials because they're all intermixed. But if the
12	libraries you tell us you want materials dealing with
13	the Mid-East war of '67, then we'll give you a search
14	of where all that material is. The USS Liberty, we
15	know where that material is. VietNam, we know where
16	that material is, so the library files are somewhat
17	more organized around subject, although we're pulling
18	from different places.
19	DR. WAMPLER: All I'm saying is that it makes
20	more sense to make recommendations based on the way in
21	which the stuff is already organized, not try to pull -
22	
23	MS. SMITH: Right.
24	DR. WAMPLER: that apart and reassemble
25	i+.

1	MS. SMITH: Yes.
2	DR. WAMPLER: Yes.
3	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Before we take these
4	questions, I just have one specific follow-up. You
5	said you wanted to avoid these competing
6	declassification efforts at the Eisenhower library. I
7	think one of our concerns should be, again, to get a
8	sense of what these efforts are so that we can think in
9	terms of a coordinated plan. Could you talk a little
10	bit more about why, from the DOD, it's being done in
11	that area, the Eisenhower library?
12	MS. SMITH: AT the Eisenhower library?
13	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Yes.
14	MS. SMITH: It's specific Jeanne, maybe
15	you can help me out here. The archivist that deals
16	with mandatory review there felt that we had some
17	record groups that were coming out that were fairly
18	duplicative of some materials he has.
19	DR. GOLDBERG: Could you stand please?
20	MS. SCHAUBLE: The Eisenhower library has a
21	microfilm of some of the records that we have in paper
22	that deal with World War II. Most of the microfilm
23	actually should be declassified except for individual
24	items on each reel that have been withheld. So we have
25	to then review those items that have been withheld to

1	see if they can now be declassified and released. If
2	we can release those items, they will be able to
3	release the entire microfilm. So it doesn't make a lot
4	of sense to go out there and try to start from scratch
5	and review the whole microfilm.
6	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: This is the World War II
7	stuff?
8	MS. SMITH: Yes, but one thing you all may
9	not realize is that presidential papers were the only
10	papers that were exempt from the (inaudible) dealing
11	with declassification of World War II materials.
12	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: But nobody's working on
13	a competing declassification effort on presidential
14	materials in the Eisenhower library. Right? So if
15	we so that whole argument for not focusing in on the
16	presidential materials in the Eisenhower library
17	because there's a competing declassification effort
18	doesn't carry any weight.
19	MS. SMITH: I guess we're not being clear.
20	Jeanne has some stuff that has been declassified that
21	we have microfilm out at the Eisenhower library. We
22	need to do the work to pare it out, to get that
23	collection taken care of so that people aren't going
24	out to the Eisenhower library and doing duplicative
25	work that we can take care of. And we have not NARA

has not done that work. We want to make sure that the agency that because it's declassified one place and it 2 3 exists at another place that we're not having the few resources that there are, spend their time on a duplicative situation. 5 So I'm sorry if I'm not being clear. We 6 could do Eisenhower library, but our priority was that it should go with the second year and we should address this one situation internally to the agency and not waste anybody's resources. 10 11 DR. GOLDBERG: Tony? MR. PASSARELLA: OSD (inaudible) office --12 DR. GOLDBERG: Would you stand please? 13 14 MR. PASSARELLA: I'm neither a records holder 15 nor a historian. 16 DR. GOLDBERG: Your voice is not quite as good as Ms. Smith's. 17 MR. PASSARELLA: Okay. I just would like one 18 clarification. All of these components are working 19 very hard to make plans to declassify all the records 20 that are 25 years old over the next five years. 21 22 still haven't heard what is the urgency to rearrange 23 all these hard efforts that are going on. Why is it --24 I mean we're talking about 25 year old records. Why is

it that we have to rush some when everyone has to have

1	them finished by five years? I mean is there a valid
2	reason for the urgency?
3	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes. It's a question of what
4	will happen to the exempted records which contain, I
5	think, most of the material that people here are
6	interested in.
7	MR. PASSARELLA: As I read the Executive
8	Order and your employing a systematic review apply.
9	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, but the question is when
10	will they get around to a systematic review of the
11	exempted records at the higher levels?
12	MR. PASSARELLA: Well I guess my question
13	DR. GOLDBERG: Without without some kind
14	- .
15	MR. PASSARELLA: here (inaudible)
16	automatic declassification, you're still going to have
17	to review the records, and you've got all these people
18	working damn hard to do the requirements of the
19	Executive Order for the next five years, and now we're
20	going to force down their throat when they're going
21	to have to review them anyhow over five years — in a
22	different direction. That's what I guess I don't
23	understand.
24	MS. SMITH: Well, there is one requirement

under the Executive Order that the archivists in the

United States declassify 15 -- some percentage of the 1 2 papers of the former presidents in the first year. So, what NARA is asking is how are we going to declassify 3 that? We did not pick 15 percent. We picked a small 4 sample -- sort of a pilot project to see if it would 5 So that's the one requirement. 6 MR. PASSARELLA: Well, I'm not worried 7 about -- I'm wondering from the historian's standpoint 8 what their urgency is on certain areas? 9 10 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I can answer that by actual -- giving you a specific reference, because the 11 answer is there's certain skepticism about whether this 12 project of total review in five years is going to be 13 14 successful. Alright? An example is the plan for the 15 Defense Nuclear Agency. It says in their section on 16 compliance methodology, that they propose to review 20 cubic feet per month for the next four and a half 17 18 years. You do the arithmetic, that gives you 1080 19 cubic feet. 20 It turns out that the material that they're 21 going to have to review adds up to 12,900 cubic feet. 22 So -- so the realities of the limited budget are such 23 that there is no way, in spite of what they say, that in this period they're going to be going through 100 24 25 percent of their material.

1	MR. PASSARELLA: I'm not representing anyone
2	here.
3	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I'm just saying I'm
4	saying on the basis of information that we were given,
5	there is certain grounds for skepticism, alright? And
6	it's simply a budgetary reality.
7	MR. PASSARELLA: That's my point
8	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: So given that, this
9	budgetary reality, that means that it makes sense to
10	talk about priorities. Let's not waste time on junk
11	when we could be focusing on real things. Let's be
12	realistic about this whole problem. That's the answer
13	to your question.
14	MR. PASSARELLA: Okay.
15	DR. GOLDBERG: Not only that but most of the
16 - "	plans call for 75 percent within five years, at least
17	not which leaves 25 percent, which could very well
18	be the kinds of things that people here are most
19	interested in. This is another reason for the
20	priorities. Yes.
21	MR. NORRIS: Robert Norris again. Just a
22	quick point of information about how would this get
23	implemented? Who would give the order to set you or
24	upon recommendation perhaps of the panel here to make
25	this the pilot project. What are the mechanics for

1	ordering you to attack those particular files?
2	MS. SMITH: Well, NARA's problem is for
3	the whole of the National Archives, we have very little
4	original declassification so any in this material will
5	have to get, because of the multiple equities, will
6	have to get reviewed by the different agencies, so if
7	this group endorses the plan and perhaps gets involved
8	with the CIA optical scanning plan, someone will be
9	reviewing the materials and getting the archives back
0	the declassification authority, so we can coordinate
1	those and get those available to the public.
2	But without people doing attacking the
3	libraries in some sort of systematic way, all that
4	we're faced with is sending in our individual mandatory
5	review requests which we've been doing for years and
6	years and years, but it is not going to address the
17	Executive Order.
8	DR. GOLDBERG: Ernest?
19	PROF. MAY: I wanted to ask — first off,
30	make a proposal which is, that we ask Ms. Smith to
21	provide this plan to this panel and to the extent that
22	she can do it, to give us some hint as to what works,
23	some alternatives to be thought about, other categories
24	and things that you might have considered
25	MS. SMITH: Oh, well I think in this other

group they were asking if we could do one library. 1 2 Yes, we can do one library; we can -- someone on this 3 group asked can we do one older library. Yes, because if it's an older library we can up the figures that say the library that had the most of what we were 5 6 proposing, which was Johnson, and try and get more like 200,000 classified items there. We can go two libraries. All we need is the input as to where you 8 9 want to go. What we were trying to do was do it where 10 we felt we were the most ready. But we are more than 11 going to try to shift. I mean --12 PROF. MAY: I just thought it would be useful 13 to us if we could look at some alternative conditions 14 that if you thought --15 MS. SMITH: Well, you can do middle Eastern 16 policy; you can do national security files; or you can 17 do a whole collection, like all of the Eisenhower or 18 Truman libraries' classified materials. 19 PROF. MAY: The second part, I have a question for you. You said that it's expensive to 20 review many of these classified documents. 21 22 expensive? 23 MS. SMITH: It's extremely expensive because 24 we have classified storage facilities at each 25 presidential library, and I can give the figures that

1	we gave to Moynihan's Commission see, I don't have
2	them with me, but we have to maintain them there. When
3	we ship them back for review, if they are at certain
4	level Top Secret or they contain departmental
5	information, they have to go a set way. Often that
6	involves a trip of 90 miles, one way, to get it there.
7	So there's a huge amount of cost in the mandatory
8	review program is extremely costly, both from National
9	Archives standpoint and the agency's standpoint,
10	because you're dealing with one document, transporting
11	it back and forth and getting multiple agencies to look
12	at our stuff, because most of our stuff will have more
13	than one equity in it. So it's very expensive.
14	Now we too have extremely limited resources,
15	and that was one reason why we tried to do something
16	that we feel we might be able to handle.
17	PROF. MAY: Did you write some thing about
18	this for the Moynihan Commission?
19	MS. SMITH: The archivist made a presentation
20	to the Moynihan Commission with some recommendations.
21	And certainly I can get a copy of that. I don't know
22	if it's specifically went into the storage costs at the
23	presidential libraries. I don't it didn't. Yes.
24	But certainly, you know, we would have to work those
25	figures up. Storage of classified materials for all of

1	the National Archives is extremely costly. The thing
2	is it's costly through the whole federal records. It's
3	not just the National Archives.
4	DR. WAMPLER: Are you going off with a
5	recommendation to review or a recommendation to
6	release?
7	MS. SMITH: I'm sorry.
8	DR. WAMPLER: Are you going off with a
9	recommendation to review or a recommendation to
10	release? Are you making a positive assertion in your
11	work plan that you think these are records that not
12	only should be reviewed, but should be released. I
13	mean
14	MS. SMITH: That should be released, yes.
15	DR. WAMPLER: did you make that kind of
16	assessment?
17	MS. SMITH: We are saying that in the
18	presidential libraries, some of you are aware, they're
19	donated historical materials. There's a donor gift
20	provision. What I'm saying is that these are records
21	that have been screened for that release, and if
22	they're declassified, once we can do the coordination
23	of the library, and there will be a time lag, the
24	majority of these materials will be released. They
25	will not be withheld for a donor deed of gift reason.

1 They've already been screened for that. 2 DR. WAMPLER: And if you come up with a non-3 concurrence, does it then get booted up to the higher interagency panel which has been established on the 5 Executive Order? 6 DR. GOLDBERG: I presume appeals can be made, 7 yes. 8 DR. WAMPLER: But -- you can -- you can 9 bargain. You can try to negotiate on this if an agency 10 says no, you can go back to them and can the panel help 11 you in that regard? 12 MS. SMITH: Yes, and as I said, the CIA plan 13 is still in the talking stage, and it's not clear to me if it's like a CIA letterhead document or they feel 14 15 it's their equity. They may do that too. This is the 16 part of the plan that is unclear to me as to how much 17 coordination NARA will be doing and what they will be 18 doing. 19 DR. GOLDBERG: Ernest, did you have anything 20 further? 21 PROF. MAY: No, thank you. 22 DR. GOLDBERG: Let me remind you that the

Moynihan Commission is the commission of protecting,

has a two year life after its first meeting.

reducing government security established by statute and

23

24

Lunch has been brought in and I suggest that

we stop at this time for perhaps 45 minutes to an hour

for lunch and then resume.

(Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the meeting was

recessed, to reconvene at 12:45 p.m., this same day,

Friday, February 23, 1996.)

1	AFTERNOON SESSION
2	12:45
3	p.m.
4	DR. GOLDBERG: Earlier this morning I
5	mentioned some areas of records that from which
6	access is excluded by statute. One of those areas is
7	prisoner of war some prisoner of war records. We
8	have with us today a gentleman who is engaged in doing
9	research in prisoner of war records who would like to
10	make a few remarks on this subject. Mr. Hall.
11	MR. HALL: Thank you Dr. Goldberg. I am an
12	independent POW-MIA researcher. I do research for a
13	number of families, a number of missing relatives that
14	were very possibly captured and not returned. The
15	intelligence records that I'm speaking about are those
16	such as the 500 (inaudible) records that were first
17	said to have been destroyed, now find that they have
18	been held at Arlington Hall and transported to INSCOM
19	(ph), but INSCOM can't locate them.
20	The same is true of the Air Force 7602nd
21	records that were previously held at Kelly Air Force
22	Base. They disappeared too.
23	Now these are two organizational records that
24	appropriately disappeared from any record group. And I
25	found some 500 MI group records out in the National

1	Record Center, but they don't they aren't the war
2	time records. They contain POW information and me
3	seeking a lot of the records through the FOIA, the DPMO
4	(ph) and OASD cannot identify these records as
5	existing. They have identified some customer copies at
6	the Library of Congress, but these don't come from the
7	original records section.
8	These are probably just an indication of
9	other records that may be missing too. There are a
10	group of records called the SAA (ph) daily summaries
11	that disappeared. They were known to exist. They
12	can't be FOIA'd; they can't be found; they can't be
13	located.
14	So if you're going to pursue research for
15	recent declassification of records, you can't exclude
1.6.	those records that the DOD components haven't properly
17	identified and I believe you have to inquire the
18	components to seek these out, because if nobody's
19	concerned about an intelligence records group for a ten
20	year period of time, and these are still classified
21	secret and above, there's really an issue of I'm
22	really concerned about intelligence records, first of
23	all, and what happens to the POW records when they

pertain to possibly living persons. The fact that they

are alive now doesn't matter because the records were

24

ı	missing this year.
2	So I believe this has to be addressed before
3	you can really continue any further in considering all
4	the records that are now becoming declassified, you
5	can't continue without considering those records that
6	should exist and haven't been destroyed there's no
7	record of destruction; they just can't be found. And
8	intelligence records, I consider, as somewhat
9	important, and I hope you do something to have DOD do a
10	more serious search for these records.
11	DR. GOLDBERG: Thank you. This is not the
12	first instance in which records have turned up missing,
13	and there are other have been other occasions when
14	other records although I don't know of any on this
15	scale in the past this large number a whole
16	record group or a large portion of a record group
17	missing.
18	I'd like to lend some more focus to this
19	discussion and point out that one of the things that
20	should come out of this meeting is the report on the
21	meeting and whatever conclusions or recommendations or
22	suggestions we have to make to higher authority.
23	And I'd like us to address our remarks then
24	to what is it that we should include in this what
25	are we prepared to include in a report at this time?

1	As a result of this meeting? What do we have to tell
2	the Assistant Secretary for C3I, who presumably will
3	then pass this report on up the line and also,
4	presumably, out to other agencies of the Department of
5	Defense? What are the things that you believe ought to
6	be included in this report?
7	Now, perhaps one thing we might discuss
8	initially and certainly within our purview is our
9	reaction to the declassification plans as a beginning
10	point. Do we want to say anything about some people
11	are obviously dissatisfied with these plans, that they
12	are not adequate, they don't answer the mail. What can
13	and should we say on this subject, if anything?
14	PROF. LEFFLER: Oh, I think one of the things
15	we should express is our concern that efforts are being
16	primarily directed at achieving a 15 percent goal,
17	rather than identifying and declassifying records that
18	are generally regarded as highly important. And I
19	would like to see some directive handed down that would
20	instruct the agencies to focus some attention on the
21	declassification of high level materials.
22	I also think that it would be desirable to
23	to emphasize the need for the Secretary of Defense or
24	somebody to allocate some additional resources to help
25	implement the declassification of what articles what

1	we've heard here is that there's really no prospect of
2	this being realistically implemented unless some
3	resources are earmarked specifically for this purpose.
4	DR. GOLDBERG: Alright. That's a good start
5	Elliot.
6	PROF. COHEN: It just strikes me, looking
7	at browsing through these some of them are not
8	really plans at all, and some clearly have been more
9	effort to get somebody else off their backs and I
10	think it would be worthwhile to call attention to that
11	fact, or to the kind of problems Mark identified,
12	where, even if you do the arithmetic, people can't
13	possibly achieve their goals.
14	And the problem I have with the 15 percent is
15	that it's clear they're not going to get to 15 percent,
1.6	and I think to the extent that we can force people to
17	fact that and maybe light a fire under some of the
18	or at least make uncomfortable some of the people who
19	are drafting plans which are perfunctory, that would be
20	a useful thing to do.
21	DR. GOLDBERG: They may get to 15 percent, it
22	may not be the 15 percent you would like to see, but it
23	is possible
24	PROF. COHEN: Well, I mean if it really if
25	they really do 15 percent a year for however long it

1	takes
2	DR. GOLDBERG: The first year anyhow.
3	OBSERVER: The first year.
4	PROF. COHEN: Well, but I mean if they should
5	be that successful
6	DR. GOLDBERG: Jim Davis.
7	MR. DAVIS: Again, I'm concerned about what
8	they can what the records are that (inaudible)
9	declassification and how many resources are being
10	devoted to automatic declassification effort? And in
11	that regard, I would like some discussion or proposals
12	simply to automatically declassify confidential records
13	that include confidential history, thereby achieving
14 .	these goals over the next five years with little or no
15	declassification review effort.
16	DR. GOLDBERG: Reaction to that? Yes.
17	MR. S. GOLDBERG: Well, there is a problem
18	with that. There's two kinds of confidential material.
19	One kind is the stuff that was classified confidential
20	when it was originated and that stuff is pretty much
21	low risk stuff, maybe a candidate for bulk
22	declassifying. But the other kind of confidential
23	material is stuff that under the original group marking
24	system was group 3, and downrated in 12 year intervals
25	from top secret and is laying there in confidential

And there's very important stuff in there and 1 2 that is probably not a candidate for bulk declassification by anybody. That's probably higher 3 level stuff. You shouldn't assume it's going to be 4 5 bulk DR. GOLDBERG: Well, it's downgraded in 6 intervals with -- couldn't it be declassified after 7 that? 8 MR. S. GOLDBERG: No, that's group 4. Group 9 10 4 was automatically -- the next category is group 3, 11 not automatically declassified, which means, at the end of at least 36 years or so, it needs to be looked at. 12 13 It's not automatically. So you can't assume that 14 everything that's confidential is junk. 15 MR. BROWN: The bulk of naval propulsion 16 information -- you may remember that the bulk of the information --17 18 DR. GOLDBERG: Beg your pardon? 19 MR. BROWN: The bulk of naval nuclear propulsion information is at (inaudible). Not subject 20 21 to declassification. 22 MR. DAVIS: What I'm talking about is --23 DR. GOLDBERG: It's exempted? 24 MR. BROWN: Yes.

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MR. DAVIS: -- you're throwing out, for

1	example, the National Archives, utilizing the finding
2	aids, if necessary a 135 as the keys of the archivist,
3	identifying confidential entries in various record
4	groups, and at the same time going out to the records
5	center and reviewing the 135s and identifying
6	confidential accessions. And then with respect to
7	official histories, identifying those that are
8	classified as confidential. Simply automatically
9	declassifying them, and and I don't say for example,
10	in the records center you're going to find an accession
11	that's classified as confidential that is the result of
12	downgrading over the years. You might, you might not.
13	But I think it would be a simple task to determine that
14.	versus going through whatever the records are that are
15	currently in category 3 and what I imagine use an
16	enormous number of resources required to do that sort
17	of thing. This would simply free up the very limited
18	resources available for the declassification review to
19	focus in on records of greater interest.
20	DR. GOLDBERG: Ms. Schauble.
21	MS. SCHAUBLE: That is kind of what we're
22	doing right now in this year. The problem with that is
23	that even in confidential files we are finding a lot of
24	restricted data. You can't just say that because it's
25	confidential you can let it go without looking at it.

1	Ι	wish	you	could.

2 DR. GOLDBERG: C

3 COL. PONNWITZ: One comment on these plans --I think we're going to have to be very careful if you're going to go back to the agency that originated 5 it, to teak (ph) their plan without asking them 6 specific questions regarding each plan that you're 7 having difficulty with. Quantification of these 8 9 numbers real or no, from the very offset, are based on estimates of the volume of material that's out there. 10 We don't even have a number in DOD that's anywhere 11 12 close to what we think the requirement is going to be. 13 As we go through our plans we will develop a 14 better feel for the quantity of materials that are out 15 So if it's quantity and numbers that we're hung up on, I don't think that now is the appropriate time 16 17 to say that that's not right. If it's process and procedures, yes, let's critique that and say hey, you 18 19 really haven't told us in the sense -- but I think it 20 would -- should go plan by plan by plan, not just a 21 generality to the superiors that says, hey, all these 22 plans are no good, because there's not enough of an 23 understanding of what is in these plans. There was no 24 guidance given as to how these plans should be 25 organized or what they should say in them. It was just

1	here's the Executive Order, tell us how you're going to
2	implement it and how are you going to meet these
3	targets. And I think that's what was attempted in each
4	of these documents.
5	DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, this yes, Bob.
6	DR. WAMPLER: One item that's already been
7	kicked around is endorsing or in some way commenting
8	upon the Presidential declassification plan. It seems
9	like everyone was agreed that this is one good first
10	cut as a possible test case for working through this.
11	DR. GOLDBERG: The Presidential Libraries?
12	DR. WAMPLER: The Presidential Libraries,
13	yes.
14	DR. GOLDBERG: We've all agree on that.
15	DR. WAMPLER: From talking, during the lunch,
16	I get the sense that there is a certain consensus
17	perhaps among the historians that a lot of high level
18	material they are very interested in are these record
19	group 330, and that moving into them is going to have
20	an impact on everybody else in this room, because of
21	all the coordination problems involved.
22	DR. GOLDBERG: Eventually.
23	DR. WAMPLER: Eventually well, but I mean
24	in some way, whereas within each service there may be
25	relatively much less high level policy information of

1	the type that we initially are interested in.
2	So the question is as a body, should we focus first
3	upon trying to develop priorities within record group
4	330, as that's in a way the most encompassing record
5	group, one which creates the most coordination
6	problems, and the one in which perhaps as a test case
7	we would get a very good sense immediately in terms of
8	feedback say, from the relevant agencies, and from
9	Frank in his office, of what are the real concrete
10	problems involved? If we say we would like to have
11	these say the list I put in, that list
12	chronologically, would be our first cut as an idea of
13	what a good sense of priorities would be. What does
14	this do to you, and try to get down to specifics to
15	deal with that. This is a learning curve, that's back
16	to this.
17	DR. GOLDBERG: Okay, I'd like to hold that to
18	a little bit later I'd like to get to that, that's
19	important, perhaps the core of what we're talking
20	about, reporting on, but I'd like to go through the
21	other items that we really should consider for a
22	possible report. And I'd like to dispose of them if
23	possible but what order.
24	So I still would like to get a sense of what
25	we ought to say with reference to the declassification

1	plans. I do think we ought to be careful in what we do
2	say, obviously. A certain amount of effort was put
3	into them, by the people who made the reports. They
4	may not be all that they ought to be and we might
5	undoubtedly want more, and this is what leads to, I
6	think, the second point here, this need for more
7	information which most of us, I think, have expressed
8	at some time or other. That we want to know to a
9	greater extent than we already know, what is there
10	it's somewhere. We're not going to get any great
11	detail, not in any reasonable period of time, but we
12	can get a better notion of the essence of what is there
13	and this could help us, I think, in determining
14	priorities eventually.
15	So I think perhaps we ought to consider these
16	things together we're talking about the
17	declassification plans and the need for more
18	information. Yes.
19	BG. ARMSTRONG: Let me suggest that it seems
20	to me that what the academic historical community are
21	primarily interested in are papers in Presidential
22	Libraries, OSD papers as they pertain to the Secretary
23	of Defense's and his principal assistants, policy-
24	making activities, and those Joint Staff JCS papers
25	that have a similar focus.

1	It would seem first of all, I'm very
2	uncomfortable with signing up to any criticism of
3	anybody's declassification plan until the person who
4	wrote that plan or who owns it comes and explains it.
5	That's not speaking as a bureaucrat, I just don't do
6	those things.
7	So I would think that it would be reasonable
8	for this body to request that the people responsible
9	for implementing the declassification plans for OSD
10	papers, and the Joint Staff papers, come in next time
11	and brief those plans as they as they exist, as
12	they're implementing them. And to the degree that they
13	can, be prepared to answer more detailed questions from
14	particularly, the academic historians as to how if
15	not the details of what are in the archives that
16	they're talking about, at least the kinds of
17	descriptive materials that would be available to the
18	historian who had particular interests in those
19	archives to pursue.
20	Once again I really I understand the
21	academic historians concern, but I really am
22	uncomfortable with an approach Professor Leffler, I
23	think, has best characterized this approach that
24	basically goes back to the archivist and says, sort of
25	tell us in these important areas what you have. I

think if the historical profession really wants to know, then they're going to have to do part of the work, and that work is going to be involved -- and I think they have a right to expect the archivist to come and explain his collection as best he can, and how to get further information. But then if you want to get information to the degree that Bob Wampler has put it out here on the table, that involves some work by historians.

And that's just sort of my view of the way
the world works. And I think it's sort of the official
historian point of view of the way the world works. I
hesitate to speak for my colleagues, but I think that's
right.

DR. GOLDBERG: Well, I find that all the things that I've jotted down, talked about, form a seamless fabric here — all related to each other because the next point I had was the need for liaison with the archivist, the declassifiers. It's going to help a great deal to know them and for them to know us when we want what they have and what they can do, and having perhaps come in and give a briefing to this panel would serve to establish a relationship which might be more difficult to get otherwise. How does that strike you?

i	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Periect.
2	DR. GOLDBERG: I like that. Any other
3	reactions to that? From the panel? Yes.
4	MR. DAVIS: When you speak of archivists
5	(inaudible), are you thinking of the archivists focus
6	in on the records, still physically in their custody in
7	the other DOD components? Again, with considerable
8	effort, depending on the size of the records, you can
9	get a fairly good idea of what the National Archives
10	holds, much generally a much more detailed idea of
11	what's at the record center or record centers.
12	With respect to collections in the physical
13	custody of DOD components, for the most part, the
14	public has no information.
15	DR. GOLDBERG: Do you have any notion how
16	extensive those are for the period prior to 1970?
17	MR. DAVIS: No, I don't. No I don't but
18	for example, in the Army declassification plan under
19	the Army Intelligence and Security Command, holdings of
20	approximately 7,000 feet are listed at some repository
21	in Virginia, and no further information is given on the
22	dates of those records, classification status, types of
23	records. Are they all paper clipped no, obviously
24	not. What kind of records are there?
25	DP COIDPERC: Wall water gains to have to

1	take this step by step, aren't we?
2	MR. DAVIS: It's just I mean that for
3	example, the repository, the public can't visit them
4	I'm not talking about reviewing the records, but simply
5	going out there and talking with a records manager
6	something along those lines.
7	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, I think we're going to
8	have to start with the very large bodies which are
9	already in the National Archives and in the federal
10	records center, because I think that's the bulk of it
11	all. If you're correct, there are some collections
12	which are still held by agencies of DOD, most of them I
13	would guess, are highly exempted records, and that's
14	why they're being held, and it would take a lot of
15	time, a lot of effort to get anything on them. I think
16	it's some thing we should keep in mind and eventually
17	get around to, but initially, I think we'll have our
18	hands full if we deal with what's in our National
19	Archives and record centers.
20	MR. DAVIS: For example, to inquire of what
21	Office of the Secretary of Defense record before 1970,
22	are still physically in the custody of OSD, where would
23	somebody go?
24	DR. GOLDBERG: I don't think
25	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: This is precisely the

1	sort of issue that we would want to talk with whoever
2	is in charge of the OSD declassification effort. This
3	is not anything we have to bring up in our report, but
4	we simply want to talk with people in an unadversarial
5	way about what their thinking is about how they're
6	tackling the problem and and the issues that you
7	raise will be brought up at that time.
8	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.
9	DR. DUDLEY: I would hesitate to accept the
10	statement that seems to indict all the plans that are
11	offered here as being inadequate, as Professor Cohen
12	did.
13	PROF. COHEN: Excuse me, that's not what I
14	said. I said some of these are perfunctory.
15	DR. DUDLEY: Well, then
16	PROF. COHEN: I said some of them are very
17	clearly not perfunctory.
18	DR. DUDLEY: Well, good, would you be willing
19	to name the plans you consider to be perfunctory?
20	PROF. COHEN: I looked at this that
21	paper but I'm sorry if I was misunderstood. I would
22	be in favor of asking people from those organizations
23	to come and talk to us about what they're planning on
24	doing. We should ask them questions and I agree with

Mr. Trachtenberg's -- a cordial conversation. Btu some

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18 know more from some plans, or perhaps all of the plans, and we would like to establish some kind of 19 20 relationship with these people, have them come before 21 us, visit us, tell us what's there and find out how they can help us and what we would like to ask of them. 22 I think that's reasonable in a report of this kind. 23 24 I'm not looking to make criticism of individual plans. 25 DR. WAMPLER: Oh, yes, in terms of request

1	for information, if you're going to assume that these
2	15 or 20 percent tranches (ph) include not only
3	category 3, but two and one, you want to know how
4	they're planning on doing it over the next five years.
5	You may find some things that we say we don't want to
6	mess with this. You're getting to some of the things
7	you want to look at perhaps in this material, but we
8	want to get behind the numbers as Mel and Mark and
9	others say, to find out, okay, what are you really
10	planning on looking at in each year as part of an
11	effort to get to this level of attainment within the
12	plan.
13	DR. GOLDBERG: You should
14	DR. WAMPLER: That's the sort of information
15	we're talking about.
16	DR. GOLDBERG: You should feel at liberty to
17	ask that. It's perfectly all right, although don't
18	tell them there's some things you don't want them to
19	mess with. You won't get a good reaction to that.
20	Tony?
21	MR. PASSARELLA: From what I'm hearing from
22	everybody here, I think from everybody here, I think
23	one of the most important things that you can put
24	forward in your report here, evaluation scheme, is
25	gongern that enough resources have been allegated to

1	executing these plans. These can be wonderful plans,
2	but if you don't have anybody to do it, then it's a
3	waste of time.
4	I think that's probably one of the biggest
5	keys to be successful in this declassification project,
6	is having the people and the resources to do it.
7	DR. GOLDBERG: It seems to me we have heard
8	that theme somewhere before.
9	MR. PASSARELLA: It's probably the only major
10	issue at this point.
11	DR. GOLDBERG: That's been brought home, I
12	think, by others also. Yes.
13	OBSERVER: If I may just remark on one thing
14	that Professor Leffler said and Professor Cohen added
15	to it the first remarks out of the chute here this
16	afternoon those comments, suggestions,
17	recommendations, are addressed to the President of the
18	United States. Nobody else can change what you suggest
19	be changed.
20	DR. GOLDBERG: I'm just afraid I don't
21	understand what you're
22	OBSERVER: The problem is you can't change
23	the 15 percent because that's in the Executive Order.
24	DR. GOLDBERG: We're not proposing to change

it.

1	OBSERVER: But that's what his recommendation
2	is.
3	PROF. LEFFLER: No, no. My concern is that
4	that we try to declassify some of the important
5	materials amongst that 15 percent, and that I think we
6	should explicitly express our feelings on this
7	committee that if we proceed or things proceed as they
8	seem to be proceeding that high level material will not
9	be declassified.
10	BG. ARMSTRONG: That's your conclusion. I
11	don't think that conclusion I don't share that
12	conclusion.
13	PROF. LEFFLER: Well, that's we can
14	discuss whether the bulk of this committee shares that
15	concern. I personally feel that.
16	COL. PONNWITZ: Right now we're doing an
17	organized random declassification that's what I
18	would call it. We have to abide by that 15 percent and
19	we start we ask our archivist, you know, how are you
20	going to do it? And they suggest they proceed in a
21	certain way to get to the 15 percent. Obviously OSD's
22	15 percent will include more high level information
23	than our 15 percent will.
24	The problem is and the difficulty is when
25	you start trying to put that in a non-random order, in

a specific order, if you're not willing to dedicate the 1 resources that can alleviate the time it' going to take 2 3 or interruption to the process we've already established, we're going to spend a lot of time talking 5 about it, but we're still going to have to continue on meeting the requirements of the Executive Order. 6 So somehow we have to decide if there is a 7 8 need to focus our efforts in a certain way, if we can 9 do it in the least disruptive manner possible -- you 10 can get with the archivist and tell them if you can do 11 this, do it in this order. If we can't do that, or 12 they come back and say I can't, this is the way I have 13 to do it, and you're not willing to put resources in to give them aid in their efforts, then you're going to 14 15 have to be satisfied with their plans and the way 16 they're going to proceed. 17 Because as we found out with the Persian Gulf 18 War declassification effort, until considerable 19 resources were dedicated to that effort, to fulfill the way DOD wanted to do it, none of us could comply with 20 the sense of urgency that it had. 21 22 And thai's the same case here. We will 23 comply with our 15 percent, but if they're not satisfied with the way we're going to do it, then find 24 25 a way to give us resources to change our approach.

1	DR. GOLDBERG: What will be the penalty if
2	you don't achieve 15 percent?
3	COL. PONNWITZ: Well, there are no counting
4	placement. If I tell you I have 4,000,000 records, I
5	could have 10,000,000 records. You don't know that.
6	If I tell you at the end of this year that I've
7	achieved my 15 percent, you're not going to know that.
8	Nobody is. And that's you know, the only time
9	you're going to know that is at the end of the process
10	if there's a lot of records still in a pile and
11	everybody's saying hey, we met the requirement and I
12	don't know if that's going to happen or not.
13	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, the question is if that
14	happens, what is the consequences? I understand in the
15	Executive Order you review or release but isn't there
16	another option, like to totally exempt this review
17	process for the records that are left over by the year
18	2000? I mean that's your out that people worry about
19	as well. And then the services are going to have
20	policy materials that are going to end up buried,
21	backlogged with a lot of high sensitive material
22	need to say, okay, we can't do it and there's a
23	loophole in the Executive Order which lets us take it
24	off the table. It may (inaudible), but it's an out in
25	the Executive Order.

1	MR. HALL: In considering these 15 percent
2	that you've declassified, any POW records were ordered
3	declassified under the existing Executive Order
4	12810DDM (ph) so any records, groups found, or
5	organizational records found that are POW records would
6	have to be put into this priority. The deadline of
7	November 1993 has been reached and the records haven't
8	been declassified; they still fall under the urgency of
9	that deadline. So if you resume your classification, I
10	request that these records be considered in that first
11	15 percent as soon as they're located.
12	DR. GOLDBERG: So much for deadlines. We all
13	know that a lot of these orders are much more observed
14	in breach. Just because it's an Executive Order or a
15	law does not mean that all the provisions are actually
16	carried out on time. They may over time, but most
17	programs fall behind, and I suspect that there's a fair
18	chance that this one's going to fall behind too. Not
19	the first year, perhaps later on. It's a very
20	difficult undertaking an enormous undertaking, and
21	if it does fall behind, I for one, will not be
22	surprised. At the end of five years a very large
23	quantity of classified documents have not been reviewed
24	as I say, I will not be surprised.
25	On the other hand, I would hope that they

1	would not be the documents that we would like to see
2	declassified. We don't know. It's going to be a mixed
3	bag. It's going to vary from service to service,
4	organization to organization. They all have their own
5	priorities, their own limited resources and we have to
6	expect a very varied result. Yes.
7	DR. WAMPLER: In terms of the recommendation
8	on the resource issue, other than a pious exhortation
9	to make more money available, what would the services
10	and agencies like to see come out of here in terms of a
11	recommendation for something that would come out of
12	Perry's office, say? Is there anything that he could,
13	if he could be persuaded, that would unleash resources
14	that we could recommend?
15	DR. GOLDBERG: Well is that the \$64,000
16	question?
17	DR. WAMPLER: Yes, what can we do in essence,
18	to make a recommendation
19	DR. GOLDBERG: Okay, what are some specifics?
20	Let's recommend one thing that was discussed at lunch
21	time as a possibility of using reserve officers and
22	become active duty and help. This has been done before
23	for a variety of purposes. These are not just
24	various periods of time; they would have to get up to
25	speed; they would have to learn what it was all about

1	so that to have them come in for two week periods
2	would not help very much. They would probably have to
3	come in for at least six months or more at a stretch.
4	But that's a possibility and I see no reason why we
5	shouldn't make that kind of suggestion. Here is one
6	way, perhaps, of stretching the resources. Now are
7	there others?
8	COL. PONNWITZ: Sir, it's beyond just
9	bringing more people on active duty. If we look at the
10	model that's been done for the Persian Gulf War
11	declassification, you have an executive agent assigned,
12	you have a facility that was developed, you had
13	resources, computers and people and reserve officers.
14	So depending on the magnitude of the problem and the
15	way you want to handle it, it almost requires
16	particularly for the OSD records and the records that
17	are of the highest policy that's where you need the
18	augmentation of personnel and equipment and a facility
19	dedicated to this process, and civilian personnel hired
20	too who are experts in this, to help you through that
21	queue faster.
22	For the rest of us, I don't know that we can
23	come up and say that we need X, Y, and Z and that you
24	would process it for us because we pretty much have our
25	plans established. I think we can meet them. But the

1	higher levels I think is where you need to focus the
2	resources.
3	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, Marines may be able to
4	do it, but I don't doubt that the other services would
5	be very glad to have some further assistance. Am I
6	correct? I think the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force
7	too for that matter. Yes?
8	MR. GRABOSKE: Well, in answer to Bob
9	Wampler's comment let me suggest that Secretary Perry
10	be asked to provide resources equivalent to what had
11	been provided to the Gulf War declassification effort
12	this year, which is roughly, I think, \$10,000,000
13	just this year. This is a much bigger program and
14	many, many more agencies involved.
15	DR. WAMPLER: Well, would you want to clarify
16	in some way right back to this program and say if
17	you're going to do this program on a scale equivalent
18	to what was provided to the Gulf War, it would come out
19	to this figure and then try to shoot for something
20	MR. GRABOSKE: Well, I never
21	DR. WAMPLER: If it's reasonable.
22	MR. GRABOSKE: (inaudible) let's just say
23	equivalent to Gulf War declassification which is
24	\$10,000,000 more than we have now, and we'll worry
25	about Secretary Perry I'll get those resources where

1	it's most appropriate.
2	DR. GOLDBERG: Clearly that's a first cut.
3	DR. DUDLEY: Yes, but if I could comment on
4	comment on that.
5	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.
6	DR. DUDLEY: The \$10,000,000 went somewhere,
7	Fred, but it didn't come down to the services and if
8	you're going to be specific about it the services
9	had had to take that Gulf War declassification money
10	out of hide, and so if you want this to be really
11	effective, it has to be specifically appropriated for
12	the services the agencies which are going to take
13	part in this program, not an upper level board which
14	absorbs all the money which is going to be appropriated
15	to it. So that perhaps specific legislation has to be
16	considered.
17	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, perhaps we can agree and
18	force the complaints of the services which are
19	legitimate and make a recommendation that the resources
20	currently allowed for the purpose are inadequate and
21	that they should be substantially augmented, and that
22	we recommend that this be brought to the attention of
23	the OMB, White House, the Congress, that if they want
24	the job done the resources will have to be made

available. Otherwise it will take a much longer time

1	probably, than already committed. Yes.
2	MR. S. GOLDBERG: Perhaps not only is this
3	effort not being funded, but current contingency
4	operations is reducing the budgets that are already
5	funded, and a lot of these people told me they're
6	only getting 60 percent of what they asked for this
7	year because of contingency operations of Bosnia. So -
8	-
9	DR. GOLDBERG: So the special
10	declassification projects are detracting from the
11	overall one.
12	BG. ARMSTRONG: Well, just general DOD
13	operations.
14	MR. S. GOLDBERG: It's operational. Yes.
15	Contingency operations in general.
16	BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes. Let me get back to
17	something Bob said a little bit earlier that I wasn't
18	aware of the concern that he expressed and that was a
19	concern, particularly with the tough nuts, the Sec
20	staff papers, the really tough declassification issues,
21	if those things are shoved out to the end of the time
22	period and then fall over the edge and by some trap
23	door basically be beyond reach of this particular
24	activity. It would seem to me that if that is a valid

concern, which I assume it is, that it would be useful

1	to express that to that this panel express that
2	concern that there ought to be some priority given
3	within these efforts to those particular kinds of
4	papers and it Once again I think you
5	academic historians can do a fair job Bob's done, I
6	think a fair job with part of that in identifying
7	the kinds of papers and issues the kinds of files
8	and issues that you're concerned about and that these
9	be raised to the Secretary of Defense and some
10	expressions be made that these be given priority
11	consideration within the declassification efforts of
12	each agency, and that each agency be asked to come back
13	and tell or give an estimate of the consequences of
14	that.
15	Because it's entirely it seems fair to me
16	that if you want particular things done and those
17	things are going to impact on how a particular agency,
18	whether it's OSD, the Joint Staffs or somebody else,
19	goes about implementing this Executive Order, that it's
20	fair to ask them to come back and tell you what the
21	cost is. And the cost may be that you only get 60
22	percent of the total job done. There is no free lunch
23	in this business. There just isn't.
24	And these guys Bill Dudley and several
25	others have been more than eloquent and forthright in

1	what they're currently faced with and the resource
2	problems they have.
3	And I think, from a historian's point of
4	view, it's perfectly right to say this is the we
5	like this effort, but within this body of information,
6	this is what we really want. And then to have the
7	people who have do the work get it, come back and say
8	fine, if that's what you really want, this is going to
9	be the consequence for what you asked us to do by the
10	Executive Order.
11	DR. CLARKE: Can I comment on that? Not
12	being a historian, I'm really more interested in
13	records keeping in its existence and
14	declassification. So I have a security clearance and I
15	know that records are being dumped but I'm kind of
16	overloaded and I don't like to waste my time here and
17	your time. I'd like to see something more specific
18	come out of the meeting here and the whole committee.
19	I think what you need is to give to Dr.
20	Goldberg not now, but pretty shortly is what I
21	call an ice breaker or three icebreakers. You need to
22	give focus and legitimacy to our efforts, and you need
23	to get a little bit more narrow than that Dave, and
24	really get tight records groups and files within those
25	records groups, perhaps some exempted ones, that with

- 1 your expertise you really think are valuable and can
- 2 highlight those and say this is exactly there it is.
- 3 This is where it is. Just as a start, a foot in the
- 4 door. But something really concrete.
- Now I have an advisory committee too and I've
- 6 got most of my academics -- academic historians. And I
- 7 do send them out over the country, voluntarily, of
- 8 course, and they lecture at West Point and they go down
- 9 (inaudible) to talk to reserves in Leavenworth; they go
- out to MHI and talk to the war colleges -- those sorts
- of things.
- Now I know you've all been to the
- 13 Presidential Libraries and the National Archives,
- haven't we all, but if you go there sometimes, even to
- just drink a cup of coffee with the fellow who's there
- as an official member of the committee -- now that kind
- of rings a bell bureaucratically, and my report or my
- 18 committee report to the Secretary of the Army and the
- 19 Chief, when he sees -- he's actually beginning to see
- that these guys are not guys that just come to
- Washington, they've actually been there in their
- official capacity to Carlisle -- I've been to Carlisle
- 23 unofficially many times to look at the records -- but -
- 24 and they talk to my people -- and they talk Army in
- 25 this case, but you can talk DOD or talk the records.

1	They talk the language and they justify these small
2	things.
3	And yes, take a look at their suggestions,
4	you know, a little bit more seriously than if they
5	would maybe come to Washington for a couple days and
6	have a little lunch that does little work and my
7	expense for me. And they pointed out, you know, a few
8	things that really I should maybe my people should
9	concentrate on. They're not five percent, they're just
10	maybe half of one percent of our total effort.
11	And when we do that also something else
2	happens some of these records are really I
3	hesitate to mention this but they're really badly
4	organized and especially at the upper levels and
5	the Lord knows exactly what records groups some of them
6	end up in. That effort that focus can sometimes get
7	the record management activity also in gear, because
8	when you're organizing records for declassification,
9	you often have to organize them for archival purposes
20	too, and questions begin to be asked so there's more
?1	benefit than just declassification when you target,
22	say, a small group of efforts this office, and DOD,
13	and this time period or this office and JCS or these
4	minutes at JCS.

And again, sometimes you have to -- it helps

1	to have an archivist come in and give you a
2	presentation. But sometimes they get nervous and they
3	don't know who they're presenting to, especially if
4	there are other high officials there. And some times
5	if you can meet with them ahead of time just to call
6	them up on the phone and say hey, how you doing? My
7	name's Joe, I teach this, that and the other thing, and
8	I'm working on this and here's what I think some of the
9	guys are really interested in having you address when
10	you come to see us.
11	Then he can tell his boss or her boss, that
12	here, this is what they really want, you know, and I'll
13	try the official briefing and I'll (inaudible) and
14	you get a lot more valuable information that way
15	sometimes. It involves I dealt with the people I
16	work with it involves Ira or John Shire (ph) or some
17	of the people from Michigan and Pennsylvania and
18	actually getting out there and talking to the guys.
19	Even just a phone call sometimes or a visit if it's
20	close by, and that face to face type thing, and it
21	really does make a difference even though it may be a
22	pain in the ass to get there many times. But sometimes
23	when you go there as an official visitor, it just does
24	something. It helps out a lot.
25	And so what I'm saying now is I think we

1	should say that listen to these recommendations the
2	committee's giving. We've all recommended that we
3	ourselves come up ASAP with some really specific hard
4	nosed suggestions that are really high priority, high
5	visibility, but they're doable but aereous (ph), and
6	perhaps someone could be even in the excepted
7	categories in order to break some of those open not
8	nuclear weapons, but some things that could be broken
9	open a little bit anyhow.
10	But that involves actually, your doing a
11	little bit of legwork and going out after the archives
12	and talking to somebody about this sometimes
13	that's you've got teaching; you've got meetings;
l 4	you've got this, you've got that. You've got a lot of
15	things to do.
16	DR. GOLDBERG: So you want to frighten all
17	these members on the panel?
18	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I think we're all on the
19	same wavelength. I'm hearing the same sorts of things
20	being said in all kinds of different ways. Maybe we
21	could come back to your initial question which is how
22	should the report be drafted, and I
23	DR. GOLDBERG: I'm pleased that you're
24	playing the role of mediator here. We need one.
25	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Yes, how can all these

1	different things that we've been saying be pulled
2	together and pitched in a report? And I think
3	everybody has said start out with the resources
4	problem. The example of the Defense Nuclear Agency
5	report that I cited before can be cited because the
6	figures are so compelling, but not in the way that's
7	critical of the people who put it together. Because
8	I liked it because I think these people being office.
9	The line we should take is these people have
10	been asked to square the circle, and what are they
11	supposed to do? They can't say this. But we can say
12	it. We're outsiders. Ideally the solution would be to
13	allocate many resources, but we have to be realistic,
14	and if in fact resources are going to be constrained,
15	this is our concern.
16	Our concern is that a rigid cap system, 15
17	percent a year, is going to lead people, for totally
18	understandable bureaucratic reasons, to focus on the
19	materials that are of least interest, to historians and
20	to the public as a whole. We understand that they're
21	constrained by the mandates of the Executive Order, but
22	we'd like that fact to be counter-balanced by a certain
23	amount of effort going into the high priority areas
24	that we've identified.
25	And then, kind of lay out what we propose to

1	do as a committee, in terms of talking to people in as
2	informal a basis as possible, as cooperative basis as
3	possible, getting a sense for the philosophy underlying
4	the declassification programs, getting people to open
5	up with us and discuss their problems with us in such a
6	way that we can have some meaningful input into a
7	solution here, and then stress the point about a pilot
8	project, the focusing on the OSD, possibly taking
9	Bob's suggestions have specific files. I think that
10	would basically do the trick.
11	DR. GOLDBERG: It's a good, sympathetic
12	approach. What we need, I think will need. I'd like
13	to now have us address ourselves to two related
14	elements which require prioritizing, namely, the
15	organizations that we would like to put emphasis on
16	and we've already mentioned some, the Presidential
17	Libraries, OSD, JCS, because that's where most of the
18	high policy materials are; and second, the subject
19	areas related to those elements that we would like to
20	see addressed by OSD, Presidential Libraries, et
21	cetera.
22	One other thought occurred to me in this
23	connection, then, is that perhaps if we are going to
24	place priorities on these particular elements of DOD,
25	we should also perhaps point out that they ought to be

1	given priority for resources also, if we're going to
2	demand more of them than perhaps the other elements, at
3	least for the time being, I would think for the first
4	year or two possibly, and it could well take that long
5	if not more. And their agencies are going to need the
6	additional assistance to begin with.
7	The others may well need it later on, because
8	presumably we will want to get similar subject areas
9	allocated to the Offices of the Secretary of the
10	Services, the Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval
11	Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps at least
12	one office in the Marine Corps is concerned with
13	policy. That sort of thing. They could come after,
14	but if we are going to establish priorities by
15	organization, then I think it's up to us to say this is
16	what we would like to see done; we think that can be
17	done if they are given some additional help.
18	I'd like you to address yourselves to that
19	now. Are we pretty well agreed on the actual
20	organizations to which we'd like to give priority?
21	Yes.
22	MR. S. GOLDBERG: I was just going to say if
23	you prioritize these organizations and just give them
24	the additional resources, you know we've said that
25	these organizations, these materials are going to take

1	the most coordination to get reviewed. And if the
2	services don't get additional resources that are going
3	to have to do the coordination on these materials, then
4	there's a little mismatch there. I think everybody
5	who's going to have to coordinate on these DOD
6	documents is going to need additional resources to get
7	that done, or you're just going to drain out what we
8	have to do on our own.
9	DR. GOLDBERG: Tony?
10	MR. PASSARELLA: Let me try to help you put
11	in perspective the resources issue. Last calendar
12	year, '95, the Department of Defense processed and
13	completed over 103,000 feet of information at request,
14	at a cost of possibly over \$33,000,000. We're talking
15	here about a tremendously amount more of work than that
16	that 103,000. That's my great concern, because
17	we're going to fall on our faces here if we're not
18	emphasizing we've got to put the resources behind these
19	people who are working so hard to do this. If we
20	don't, it's not going to succeed, no matter how many
21	lists you give people, no matter how many plans are
22	prepared or whatever.
23	And we're talking, you know, \$10,000,000 for
24	the Gulf War thing; another \$33,000,000 for the Emquoia
25	(ph). I don't know even have the costs in for NPRs

- 1 I mean we're spending a lot of money 2 declassifying information. This is so much bigger than anything we've ever done. 3 BG. ARMSTRONG: Tony, was that the entire Department of Defense -- 103,000? 5 MR. PASSARELLA: That's the entire Department 6 of Defense. 7 BG. ARMSTRONG: Okay. 8 9 MR. PASSARELLA: That's just FOIA. 10 DR. WAMPLER: How does that break down 11 between search and review? I mean what component of 12 that ---MR. PASSARELLA: That's complete cost. 13 14 DR. WAMPLER: Yes, but what -- you're 15 comparing it a little bit (inaudible) but research is -16 17 MR. PASSARELLA: Not much is research. 18 most expensive is in review. The search problem is --19 you come down here and you couldn't find it -- and 20 that's --21 DR. WAMPLER: Okay.
- MR. BROWN: Another aspect to keep in mind —

 we're talking DOD and the military departments of DOD

 agencies right now, but soon this will require

 coordination outside of the Department of Defense so

1	we've got to make sure that their priorities are the
2	same priorities that we have, otherwise ours will
3	impact on their staff.
4	BG. ARMSTRONG: Well it goes they go into
5	a FOIA queue, which is a chronological queue.
6	OBSERVER: But there is no assurance that it
7	would go into a FOIA-like queue. I mean there are no
8	procedures for inter-agency coordination established a
9	this point, and that's what Nancy Smith and I attended
10	a meeting on a week ago this capture program.
11	There's no procedure yet to assure that, you know, my
12	stuff is really important, so it's going to go to the
13	top of the pile, and I'm CIA.
14	BG. ARMSTRONG: There is a procedure but the
15	procedure is it goes to the bottom of the queue. My
16	stuff my history
17	MR. PASSARELLA: With FOIA
18	BG. ARMSTRONG: For FOIA, yes.
19	OBSERVER: I'm not talking about FOIA
20	though this is an automatic inter-agency
21	DR. GOLDBERG: Alright, therefore we do want
22	an effort about
23	MR. S. GOLDBERG: They're also reviewing
24	their records, so they're going to do their materials
25	first before your coordination.

1	MR. PASSARELLA: So there needs to be a
2	government-wide procedure for processing the inter-
3	agency coordination.
4	DR. WAMPLER: I thought well, the inter-
5	agency commissions set up by the Executive Order is
6	supposed to try to facilitate that alignment of
7	priorities.
8	MR. PASSARELLA: As far as an issue, though,
9	if it isn't done well, you can end up with stalemate
10	because you're not getting things back.
11	OBSERVER: So that people outside the
12	government cannot establish priorities within 26
13	DR. WAMPLER: No, that's the real high one;
14	but I thought there was another lower one the one
15	that has each agency rep on it.
16	DR. GOLDBERG: Appeals that's an appeals -
17	- it's an appeals panel.
18	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well, they'll not get
19	involved with tying to establish
20	DR. GOLDBERG: No, the other one council -
21	- is the one that would be concerned with the means,
22	procedures. It's not in existence yet.
23	DR. WAMPLER: Well then, should we, as part
24	of our recommendations, point out the need to try to
25	address this on

1	DR. GOLDBERG: On a broader scale
2	government-wide.
3	DR. WAMPLER: Because it's going to affect
4	not just DOD but everyone. You kick theirs to the
5	bottom of the list because they're kicking yours to the
6	bottom of the list. Everybody slows down.
7	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, of course you know, we
8	don't have to wait. I mean we might have to wait a
9	long time to the coordination. I've sometimes waited a
10	year or two to get the history cleared by NFC or State
11	or CIA. But there are many DOD records that can be
12	cleared, presumably, leaving those from outside
13	agencies to be done later. It complicates things, but
14	I mean if you already want to get anything out, that's
15	what you may have to do. Instead of waiting for
16	everybody, including everything. If you take a set of
17	files or a group, you may have to do it piece meal.
18	And I admit that's difficult, and it's complicated.
19	DR. CLARKE: If we don't get started, it
20	won't get done.
21	DR. GOLDBERG: Beg pardon?
22	DR. CLARKE: If we don't start, it won't get
23	done.
24	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, true. So I think
25	something we're going to have to face up to is that

1	this is going to be a long and involved and difficult
2	process. I think we can help. I think we get more
3	may get done as a result of what we do here during the
4	next few years that would have gotten done otherwise.
5	So to that extent, what we are doing can be useful, and
6	I'd like to see us continue.
7	Yes, we're going to have to make some very
8	general recommendations, but what I'm trying to talk
9	about now is the more specific ones. I think we're
10	agreed that we could report that we would like to see
11	emphasis placed on Presidential Libraries, OSD and JCS.
12	The question is do we want to suggest any subject areas
13	or clusters of subject areas. And I say suggest,
14	knowing we don't know a lot more than that at this
15	point. Do we want to be specific in that regard?
16	We've had a number of suggestions already made here
17	today. Do we want to say some thing concrete on this
18	subject and say we would like to see these particular
19	areas in particular looked at? Or given top priority
20	within OSD, Presidential Libraries, and so forth?
21	I think they would have to be linked to
22	mention subject areas, you'd have to link them to
23	specific organizations, because I don't think you can
24	do it all the way across the board immediately.
25	PROF. MAY: Are you speaking of specific

1	subjects as the Presidential Libraries spoke of Eastern
2	Europe and
3	DR. GOLDBERG: Even more specific, if
4	possible, yes. Correct.
5	PROF. MAY: How much more specific?
6	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, nuclear weapons
7	planning, well for instance.
8	BG. ARMSTRONG: Let me suggest what the Java
9	tank for how she was going to do the Joint Chiefs of
10	Staff files. She has listed in there the files series
11	exemptions. And I realize that some of these things
12	are pretty general, but on the other hand, some of them
13	aren't. Here's a file thing: "Evaluation of plans for
14	the strategic air offensive". Now Elliot, that's your
15	bag. Do you want that kind of stuff?
16	PROF. COHEN: Sure.
17	BG. ARMSTRONG: Okay, fine. The historians
18	have to tell us that you know. That some other of
19	this stuff you probably don't care about. So
20	PROF. COHEN: Well you're right, I guess.
21	The import of that, I think, for the panel is that you
22	do have to dig fairly deeply into each of these areas
23	before you can say anything that's meaningful. That's
24	why I trust a certain amount of frustration with some
25	of these plans because there isn't even that level of

- detail. But I think you know, one advantage in

 having a self-serving discussion with the Joint Staff

 about what is in these files and what do the files look

 like.
- But I think the problem that poses for the
 panel is that it means you do go through this piece
 meal, but I don't really see how there's frankly,
 there's that much that's general that we could say —
 aside from everybody seems to agree that all of this is
 under-resourced.

BG. ARMSTRONG: But — Al had suggested that — and I agree with him — I think that your interest, at least initially, primarily focuses on high policy. This tends to be found in three sets of organizational records plus certain additional positional records that reside in each of the services record groups, and that taking some time to listen to and having the people come in to you and tell you or deputying someone like Bob to come and listen over there where you can actually get into a holding area and set down with the person who has the knowledge, go through at this. It's some thing that I think is going to be required. It's not required, you don't have to do the same level for the Army, the Navy, the Marines and the Air Force.

1	And I think that you also when you're
2	talking about going to the Secretary and talking about
3	resources I think that Al's suggestion that if
4	you're going to focus initially on these kinds of
5	records initially, Mr. Secretary, we believe that
6	the while we acknowledge that every effort is under-
7	resourced and under-funded, basically it's unfunded is
8	another way of saying it because there's no additional
9	funds we believe that your priority if you choose to
10	put in additional resources, which is what we
11	recommend, should go to supporting these areas.
12	I understand the coordination problem, but
13	I'll tell you, if you try to salami-slice out each of
14	the what is going to be a small pot of money, you
15	may end up getting nothing. And I know everybody
16	would like to have money out of this, and it's a cinch
17	I'm not going to get any money out of it. I know that.
18	COL. PONNWITZ: One area I'd like to comment
19	on I concur wholeheartedly with the priorities
20	established through the organizations. The topics or
21	subjects you pick are really going to have to be
22	thought out well, because the product is not going to
23	be a perfectly organized, catalogued, indexed, under
24	classification product. When we get done, even though
25	you may have searched your files and nulled out a

1	particular subject, references to that subject are
2	buried everywhere, and in the end, you're going to have
3	a whole lot of unclassified documents that aren't
4	organized particularly well.
5	And that is where the challenge is going to
, 6	be to the user, to make sense of all this and put it
7	together in some meaningful way that you can derive
8	conclusions and interact things that aren't interacted
9	right now and won't be when you get the product.
10	So I think we have to be very careful when we
11	say we want specific information focused to this
12	subject, realize you're not going to get all of it;
13	you're going to get some of it and be patient for the
14	rest because we won't know where it is until we're all
15	done through the declassification process, if then.
16	DR. GOLDBERG: The rule is that with the
17	exception of JCS, the higher the level, the more poorly
18	organized the files and I speak quite seriously in
19	saying this from personal experience. The higher the
20	level, the more difficult it really will be to use the
21	files and get the information for this purpose of
22	declassification the more diffused they are.
23	But it's another one of the problems there
24	are very many that we face in attacking this
25	problem, and I think we do have to attack it.

1	The question still remains, do we want to
2	specify any particular subject areas in connection with
3	the top level organizations that we've identified, and
4	I think agreed on. I believe there's a consensus on
5	the organizations that ought to receive emphasis
6	initially. Now do we want to go beyond that and see if
7	we would like we suggest, we recommend that priority
8	be given to for example, like the pilot project
9	to these particular areas?
10	DR. WAMPLER: Well, I think that would have
11	to be gauged in terms of this list that Dave Armstrong
12	pointed to, otherwise you're telling the archivist to
13	go search your stuff.
14	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, it's a question of how
15	much
16	DR. WAMPLER: Well we also don't know how
17	many boxes or files
18	DR. GOLDBERG: No, I'm not talking about the
19	amount of files how many items we want to include in
20	our request? I mean we can this is an initial
21	effort. This is the first time. We don't want to
22	overwhelm anybody. What we're really, I think, ought
23	to be doing is giving an indication of the things that
24	we'll probably be interested in.
25	DR. WAMPLER: Okay, then I would state it in

1	terms of saying if we want to buy the list like that
2	saying this is our sense of our top ten issues, and
3	we will be guided by this general sense of priorities
4	in making further recommendations about individual
5	accessions and files to indicate that that's sort of
6	the map or the guidelines we're following. I I
7	don't see any point beyond that in developing a list of
8	subjects to turn in.
9	BG. ARMSTRONG: The problem with that
10	Walter you're the guy who knows the files I would worry
11	about. If you list an issue, and you're talking about
12	the JCS files, that may or may not cut across whole
13	sets of files, and you really have to say guys,
14	specificity is just required here, and specificity
15	means work, and it means specific work.
16	DR. GOLDBERG: But is it required
17	OBSERVER: definitely, very definitely
18	have to key it into the wording of the JCS files
19	there's no other way to do it.
20	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, but we don't have to do
21	it in this report. We can do it directly with the
22	organizations involved, it's the way it ought to be
23	done. We give them to top-level general items. And
24	then we specify to them, and not necessarily in this
25	report.

1 -	DR. WAMPLER: Okay, so you say you want
2	nuclear weapons, strategic plans and operations, Korean
3	War, Viet Nam War, NEDRNE (ph) and you know,
4	alliance relations I mean, you know, you kick them
5	off and you say these are the things that really
6	interest us.
7	DR. GOLDBERG: That's right, and we will -
8	- DR. WAMPLER: Pursue this sense of priorities
9	in making your further decisions.
10	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I sense that this is not
11	an issue. We don't have to put it in the report, if
12	you want to have something just very general, go ahead
13	and do it. It doesn't mean anything. We it's been
14	clear enough from our discussion today the general
15	sorts of issues that we place we consider to be most
16	important. There have been representatives from OSD,
17	JCS who are actually going to be doing this work, heard
18	this. If they want to fine tune their understanding of
19	our thinking, you do this in the process of
20	conversation. It just emerges naturally.
21	DR. WAMPLER: No, what I'm thinking
22	correct me if I'm wrong Dr. Goldberg, but you want to
23	give these people a sense that not only are we making
24	recommendations, we have a rationale for our
25	recommendations.

1	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, of course.
2	DR. WAMPLER: I mean that we're not just
3	picking these things out of thin air and saying we'd
4	like to see this, we'd like to see this and we'd like
5	to see this. But we chose these with priorities in
6	mind.
7	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Is there any doubt?
8	DR. WAMPLER: Well, there might be. Might
9	be.
10	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Well, then, let the
11	people who have the doubts express them. But but
12	the important thing is that the people doing the actual
13	declassification work and to the extent that they're
14	interested in our thinking can ask what our thinking is
15	to factor into their own work process.
16	MR. HALL: Can I request again the POW
17	information be requested and put on that list because
18	as it stands all wars, including the Korean War, up to
19	and including the present so it isn't listed
20	isn't limited to any one record. And I'm speaking not
21	just for myself but for different organizations, the
22	National Alliance of Families and a number of family
23	members they would very much like to have you
24	consider this a priority. It's more than a few
25	individual interests. It's a large (inaudible)

1	interest.
2	MS. SCHAUBLE: I would like to say from the
3	point of view of efficiency and process, you really
4	have to work the way the records are organized. If you
5	try to get too specific on topics, people are going to
6	jump from one place to another in the records and
7	you're never really going to get anything done as a
8	whole. I have to work on a series a record series
9	basis in order to work efficiently.
10	JCS records may be organized differently so
11	that it makes sense there to work on a topical basis.
12	But you're going to have to look at the way each
13	organization's records are organized in order to decide
14	what is the most efficient way to tackle those records,
15	because I'm sure we don't want to make recommendations
16	to an organization that's actually in a way that's
17	going to impede their efforts as opposed to expediting
18	it.
19	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, the Executive Order
20	the clients do talk in topical areas, but I've been
21	skeptical of that also. I don't think we will or we
22	should give very specific lists in this kind of report.
23	If we're going to do that, we would do it directly in

dealing with the agencies involved. Here, I think,

what to do is to give the people whom we send this

24

report the notion of what we consider the important 1 things that we would like to see addressed, and we can 2 list some of those. This is the sort of thing we think 3 ought to be emphasized. In dealing with agencies directly we will -- we will specify more precisely what 5 it is we're interested in. I think that would serve 6 7 the purpose. MR. S. GOLDBERG: This is a quarterly panel 8 9 meeting. The next meeting is scheduled for May. I think -- I don't see why you have to bite off too much 10 11 at this first meeting. I think talking about the 12 resource problem, the coordination problem, trying to 13 emphasize a higher level OSD, JCS, Presidential thing, is enough. I don't see where you really need to get 14 15 into the details of specific documents first. Let's chew on these issues first --16 17 DR. GOLDBERG: We're not talking about 18 specific -MR. S. GOLDBERG: -- for two or three months. 19 20 DR. GOLDBERG: We're not talking about 21 specific documents, obviously. 22 MR. S. GOLDBERG: This discussion --23 DR. GOLDBERG: We're talking in general 24 Ernest? areas.

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PROF. MAY: Well, it seems to me you can take

1	three topics. You can take the two that were
2	identified for the Presidential Libraries because they
3	have already set aside documents in those areas and
4	they're represented what the problems are for us
5	endorse their effort they've taken the lead in. The
6	Assistant Secretary at the Department has asked to
7	further that effort, assist in that effort you urge
8	that they do so that seems to me to make sense.
9	Then, there's an argument for choosing one
10	other subject and I think you in fact nailed it
11	subject familiar to us, the U.S./Soviet Strategic
12	Nuclear Competition, because for a different reason.
13	Not because it's been identified and because they're
14	well on the way, but because it provides, I think as
15	good a test as you can get of the exempted categories.
16	Every one of these except the one for the protection of
17	the president and the vice president.
18	And that seems to me and I've had a
19	disturbing sense throughout our discussion that part of
20	what we ought to be about has been neglected, because
21	we have been tending to think about this in terms of
22	what scholars want in their queue of interest, but if I
23	understand the intent of the Executive Order, it is to
24	serve that interest, but over a period not
>5	immediately but over the five year period but with an

1	outcome, if it works, in which the number of exempted
2	documents at the end of the five year period is reduced
3	to its minimum. And it is defensible in these terms,
4	in terms of with most of these being conditioned up,
5	think seriously and demonstrably those modifiers are
6	there.
7	So it seems to me to be important at this
8	stage to find out how hard it is to identify those
9	things that you want to have exempt at the end and to
10	try to ease the process that everything else looks
11	so you know how to identify and find the things that
12	need to be kept classified.
13	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, I think that using
14	Presidential Libraries' plan would be a good handle for
15	moving into OSD and JCS. They do specify the areas.
16	We could add another one. We might be well advised to
17	confine ourselves to a limited number of that sort
18	and say this is just a beginning; these are examples or
19	instances of the direction in which we should be going.
20	We will have some more to recommend in the future.
21	COL. PONNWITZ: Sir, I'd like to add one
22	comment, if I may. I concur whole heartedly with
23	Professor May's comment. I would ask that you put one
24	caveat in there to you know, satisfy the concerns
25	regarding the POWs that since this POW issue is so

1	significant, and since obviously some records have been
2	missing over time, that in your declassification search
3	if you find any reference to POWs that it be
4	highlighted and segregated so that those leads can be
5	followed. Not necessarily focus the search to POWs,
6	but as you do your declassification if you find
7	material that obviously might have been missing or was
8	neglected before that it be highlighted.
9	DR. GOLDBERG: Alright. That may be
10	possible.
11	MR. S. GOLDBERG: That sort of effort is
12	happening within the DOD at all times. The CPMO people
13	are coming at all of us asking do you have any more
14	have you found any more POW stuff, and you know, when
15	we find it we tell them and it proceeds through
16	COL. PONNWITZ: And all I'm asking is that
17	that you reemphasize that here in this report.
18	BG. ARMSTRONG: One thing I think might I
19	think should be done and that is, you're going to
20	address the issue of resources, and you're also going
21	to address the fact that the historical community has
22	certain interests that it wishes to highlight and it
23	wishes to have influence the declassification efforts
24	of the agencies. I think you ought to also acknowledge
25	that the degree to which those interests change the

1	declassification efforts that have originally been
2	planned, they may in fact, without additional resources
3	they will influence how the declassification process
4	goes and they may well either delay it or result in
5	additional costs. Because every time every time you
6	change something or make it more specific, you make it
7	more effective for the historian, but you may well make
8	it less efficient for the declassifier.
9	PROF. MAY: What I was suggesting actually
10	was not that that not be done. You have the two
11	topics which have been chosen by the Presidential
12	Libraries. They already
13	BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes.
14	PROF. MAY: but that's a it's not our
15	desire to have Viet Nam, Eastern Europe
16	BG. ARMSTRONG: I thought you were going to
17	extend those into OSD and JCS records.
18	PROF. MAY: I would start with the
19	Presidential Libraries.
20	BG. ARMSTRONG: Oh, okay.
21	PROF. MAY: The records are OSD. That's part
22	of their problem is getting the coordination and I
23	suggested that you add one other, not for the historian
24	interest in it, but to pass a test of how you apply the
25	exemptions and how you that seems to me to be the

1	hardest thing is to figure out how you determine what
2	needs to be remain classified at the end of five
3	years. And we ought to suggest what we can to help
4	that. And I think if we take something hard and help
5	test how much it would cost.
6	BG. ARMSTRONG: Well, if you take something
7	hard, you're going to expend a lot of effort doing
8	that, and that's going to have costs for how you
9	execute the overall program. That's the point I'm
10	trying to make.
11	DR. WAMPLER: But I think it's important.
12	Say you take nuclear or the nuclear competition, and
13	one of the things we ask for in terms of briefing and
14	liaison is say, under your existing plans, how do your
15	plans address the review of these issues? Okay. That
16	gives you your baseline. If you want to fiddle with
17	it, then you start feeling out the increased costs that
18	you're concerned about, but in some way you're just
19	trying to get some idea of the contours.
20	I mean I'm assuming that under whatever plan
21	you've got, in each yearly tranche, that is further
22	disaggregated down into category 1, 2, and 3 and
23	maybe 3's finally getting smaller and the other two
24	groups growing in size as a portion of the overall
25	part. How is that happening? How are our priorities

1	being reflected in your existing plans and how do we
2	evaluate that so that we have a sense of what it costs
3	for the recommendations that we've made? Because we're
4	making them just in a vacuum.
5	BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes, that's right, but that's
6	going to require agencies to come and tell you
7	DR. WAMPLER: Or I think we should have
8	some ongoing connection between now and May, not just
9	have this stop and then pick up again three months from
10	now.
11	PROF. LEFFLER: I worry about the emphasis on
12	the nuclear competition issue. If you recall, Nancy
13	specifically said that they had identified things that
14	they believe could be easily declassified, and that was
15	one of their benchmark criteria. She also said that
16	she would be equally happy with a different approach
17	and just go to one or two libraries and just try to
18	cover those libraries completely for all issues.
19	My sense is that focusing on an issue like
20	the strategic nuclear competition is going to absorb so
21	many resources because they're the most sensitive
22	issues of all, that there's going to be a huge part of
23	the academic community which is not interested in that,
24	but interested in all sorts of other policy issues
25	which will get nothing, while tremendous amounts of

ï	resources are focused on this very specific issue.
2	Keeping in mind also that this committee is
3	really weighted very heavily amongst the academic
4	people, the people that are particularly interested in
5	the strategic issue, and it may we may be regarded
6	very negatively for us to focus specifically on that
7	issue which is clearly the interest of most of the
8	people on this committee, and not the larger interest,
9	speaking of the whole academic area.
10	DR. GOLDBERG: But there are other subjects
11	you were going to propose that incur in your interest
12	also and that will also take
13	PROF. LEFFLER: No, I I
14	DR. GOLDBERG: a lot of time.
15	PROF. LEFFLER: I don't believe frankly,
16	my own view is that we should not identify specific
17	subjects at this time. Having used enormous amounts of
18	resources, I very much share the view that the easiest
19	way to go through and really get things accomplished is
20	by taking categories of records, perhaps just the way
21	you enumerated them Bob, on your list for example. If
22	you really want to get something accomplished quickly,
23	you identify the categories of high level, like you did
24	for the OSD records, and have them go through those

systematically for all the issues that may fall within

1	there.
2	Now, if your own interests and most of our
3	interests are in atomic and strategic things are
4	immediately covered when you say RG330, Assistant
5	Secretary for Atomic Affairs. You're going to get a
6	lot of stuff in that and it will be done very
7	systematically. You go through ISA, you're going to
8	get a lot of other things.
9	So I would say my suggestion is we even
10	try not to do too much today I agree with you,
11	Sheldon, very that we have identified high level
12	things that we want to regard, and that we begin next
13	time with a specific focus on OSD, RG330 and in
14	discussing it in some detail, we make a decision. Do
15	we want to go through it through these file numbers
16	like you identified? Or do we alternatively want to go
17	through it by identifying certain subjects?
18	But I also think that focusing or putting a
19	statement in about the Presidential Libraries, like you
20	said, Ernie, is extremely on target. That they've done
21	the work and we all know it's high level let them
22	go ahead and try to do that and begin to allocate
23	resources for them.
24	DR. WAMPLER: But I think what we were

discussing was not making suggestion that they focus,

If you're but saying, these are our primary interests. 1 2 going to arrange briefings, that gives them a way to 3 focus their briefings. To come in and say, okay, these are the real hard nuts to crack, that you indicate an interest in; these are the problems involved; these are 5 the costs involved -- which gives us some more data 6 upon which we can then make our recommendations. 7 We know more about the universe we're working 8 9 in other than our own scholarly interests, more about what it means on the other side, and if you pick the 10 hardest one -- nuclear, if you want to go into 11 12 intelligence, it may even be harder in some ways --13 you've got to figure that other things are going to be less difficult than that and you can then factor back 14 15 from that by using your worse case to get a sense of just what the problems are. And you're just using that 16 17 as a way of structuring the briefings in your initial 18 communication with these people, not as just a way of 19 saying this is what we think you should focus on. 20 PROF. TRACHTENBERG: Why not leave the 21 structure of the briefings up to them? Because you're 22 saying this is what we're interested in, you're saying, 23 speak to this specifically and it's distorting the 24 structure of the briefing. Just let -- let them --

they're the ones that have to do this whole

1	declassification project. Let's let them do the lay
2	out what their thinking is, their whole philosophy of
3	approaching it. If they have problems
4	DR. WAMPLER: But shouldn't we lay out
5	questions we'd like to have answered, rather than have
6	them come here to air a briefing and then discover that
7	they're not prepared to answer the questions we're
8	interested in.
9	PROF. TRACHTENBERG: I think maybe the people
10	who actually do this can answer this. What do you want
11	from us? What do you want from us? Do you want
12	specific questions that we you do? What
3	questions of what nature?
4	MR. BROWN: We have submitted plans for
5	declassification
6	DR. GOLDBERG: Can you speak up, please?
7	MR. BROWN: following guidelines that were
8	laid out by Steve Garfinkle when he gave us guidelines
9	for agency declassification. And we followed them.
20	And that's what we reported in our plan. And those
21	plans were then approved by Steve Garfinkle, which was
22	the requirement, that Steve Garfinkle approve those
23	plans. He did.
24	Now if there's a problem with those plans, or

we need to put something else in those plans, I don't

1	want to keep coming in and taking an essay test and
2	getting an F. I want to know what it is you want to
3	know.
4	PROF. COHEN: Then isn't the solution then
5	that we ask to be briefed on declassification plans?
6	DR. GOLDBERG: That's one of the things we're
7	talking about, yes.
8	PROF. COHEN: And then you have I don't
9	think people are disagreeing as much as it may sound.
10	If you have a briefing on the declassification plans,
11	then you have a conversation basis.
12	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, in asking for a
13	briefing, I think it probably would be desirable to ask
14	for some thing conditional that may not be there, to
15	give us more of an idea of the kinds of things that
16	they have that we might get at, and even in terms of
17	some specifics. What sort of things do you have on
18	this subject? Or this subject?
19	PROF. COHEN: Well, I don't think
20	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, some may be prepared on
21	their own and others may not be
22	PROF. COHEN: Well, if you asked to be
23	briefed on the declassification plan, they wouldn't
24	submit, you know, here's a list of the major certain
25	files that we have

1	DR. GOLDBERG: Not necessarily, no. Some
2	might and others might not, that's why you want to give
3	them some guidance at least, but I sense from this
4	discussion that perhaps we need to give some more
5	thought and some more attention to whether we do want
6	to specify any areas, any topics, subjects, whatever.
7	We might be well advised for the time being,
8	to confine ourselves to saying that we think that
9	emphasis ought to be placed on these particular offices
10	the Presidential Libraries, OSD, JCS. We think that
11	in order for this to be done, because these are the
12	places where the most important and many of the most
13	sensitive materials are, in order for this to be
14	accomplished additional resources are needed. Now we
15	think that the most serious consideration ought to be
16	given at the highest levels to provide additional
17	resources to these agencies in order to do this.
18	We would like, in the future, perhaps in the
19	near future, to provide some further thoughts on the
20	subject of how they might go about this. The
21	particular areas of greatest interest and importance to
22	the public perhaps ought to be addressed in some order
23	of priority. We're going to give it some more thought,
24	and in the future, we would like to provide this kind
25	of material information.

1	Does that strike you as a reasonable
2	approach?
3	DR. WAMPLER: As a way of being even more
4	concrete, say on the basis of the Fowler series
5	exceptions on the JCS
6	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.
7	DR. WAMPLER: Can they very quickly give you
8	a little mark to the side saying second year, third
9	year, fourth year? When they get at these? I mean
10	that at least would
11	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, can't we get that
12	directly from them instead
13	DR. WAMPLER: If they come prepared to
14	answer.
15	DR. GOLDBERG: Beg pardon?
16	DR. WAMPLER: If they come prepared to
17	answer.
18	DR. GOLDBERG: Sure and that's
19	DR. WAMPLER: That's I would tell you
20	DR. GOLDBERG: That's what we would have to
21	do with them directly. It would not be part of this
22	report.
23	DR. WAMPLER: No.
24	DR. GOLDBERG: Part of this report we would
25	say, we look forward to having briefings, of having

1	direct connections with all of these organizations or
2	working with them to achieve the goals which we had in
3	mind.
4	BG. ARMSTRONG: I think it would be fair, if
5	you want a JCS briefing, if before you get that
6	briefing, you go through their plan and you tick off
7	first of all, you tick off questions like Bob has
8	when are you going to get to this stuff? The second
9	thing you tick off is okay, looking at all these pages
10	of things, I'm interested in and maybe each
11	scholar's interested in this general subject area could
12	list four or five of these that he particularly wants
13	to know what's in there.
14	You're not going to get him to come in and
15	tell you what's in in any sort of detail in every
16	one of these exemptions. But if you have a particular
17	interest in how Joe Stalin was going to go up in a
18	mushroom cloud in 1952, then you go in there, you find
19	where that is or is likely to be in these exemptions,
20	and you ask them to talk about it as best they can,
21	defining aids that define that particular file.
22	But you've got to ask them in advance. You
23	don't you're not going to get a GS-13 over here
24	you might get a 15 that could tell you that, but you're
25	never going to get a 13, and the 15 works for

1	Passarelli, he doesn't want
2	PROF. COHEN: You can do that on the basis of
3	the information of the Joint Chiefs
4	BG. ARMSTRONG: Yes.
5	PROF. COHEN: Some of these
6	BG. ARMSTRONG: Sure.
7	PROF. COHEN: you don't have enough
8	information to do that.
9	BG. ARMSTRONG: Well, you know SAC I mean
10	Curtis Lemay.
11	DR. GOLDBERG: Would it be useful to have
12	members of the panel specialize in one declassification
13	plan or another so that somebody has some
14	responsibility in some special interests in a
15	particular area, JCS, OSD policy or some of the others,
16	and would be prepared to interact with the
17	representatives of that agency in a knowledgeable way?
18	Otherwise we might well diffuse our efforts and talk
19	around the subject instead of getting to the heart of
20	it? Perhaps we can work that out with you individually
21	to see which particular declassification plans you
22	would be prepared to undertake.
23	MR. DAVIS: Talking about a few of the
24	category 1 or 2 records, what is everybody thinking of
25	with respect to the type of ordinary, systematic review

1	without redaction or some sort of declassification
2	review with redaction? Of course that impacts greatly
3	on the resource question.
4	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes.
5	MR. GRABOSKE: This is to be a non-redaction
6	review. It's up or down you're going to look at it.
7	A document's going to be up or down; a series is going
8	to be up or down not (inaudible) shakedown. There's
9	no time or resources for that.
10	MR. DAVIS: That I think is and correct me
11	if I'm wrong but I think that will save greatly on
12	the amount of time (inaudible) document. I would ask
13	that whenever a document is pulled, because this has
14	been a problem, that some sort of adequate description
15	of the document be placed on a pull card and the pull
16	card is inserted in the files. And that may appear at
17	a first glance to be very technical matter, but if
18	information, for example, the author of the document,
19	the date of the document, the recipients of the
20	document, an unclassified subject line if
21	information of that nature isn't on a pull card, you
22	folks who work in the declassification area often get a
23	lot of unnecessary FOIAs and NPRs.
24	DR. GOLDBERG: That means you have to ask for

still additional resources.

1	DR. WAMPLER: But NARA does that when they
2	process these
3	MR. DAVIS: That's standard procedure.
4	DR. WAMPLER: Yes.
5	DR. GOLDBERG: Alright.
6	DR. WAMPLER: Well, sometimes there's
7	information, for example, on the contents of the
8	document on the pull card, and sometimes there's not.
9	MR. DAVIS: Well sometimes they classify the
10	title.
11	DR. WAMPLER: Pardon?
12	MR. DAVIS: Sometimes they classify the
13	title.
14	DR. WAMPLER: Well, sometimes it's a
15	classified subject in these documents, but oftentimes -
16	- even though it's a TRSD (ph) document, it's an
17	unclassified subject.
18	MR. S. GOLDBERG: Sometimes it's not.
19	MR. DAVIS: Sometimes it's not, but when it's
20	not, all I'm asking is that as an example that
21	unclassified subject line be placed on the pull card.
22	So the people in subsequent years can make an informed
23	decision on whether they're going to include it in the
24	FOIA or the NPR.
25	MS. SCHAUBLE: It's mostly the documents we

1	get are not portion marked, we can't always tell how
2	much information we can put on these withdrawal cards
3	without going over into unclassified areas.
4	MR. DAVIS: Well, at a minimum we could ask
5	that if there's an unclassified subject line on the
6	document that please place it on the pull card.
7	PROF. MAY: We could endorse that. We would
8	also endorse the principle of the specific basis for
9	the exemption being there not the general, but it is
10	one of the exempt categories.
11	DR. GOLDBERG: Which of the specific?
12	PROF. MAY: For example, there certainly is
13	some form of restrictive data that low classification
14	that (inaudible) by; but there is on the other hand,
15	top secret restrictive data that is known to every
16	physicist in the world.
17	DR. GOLDBERG: Such as how to make a bomb.
18	PROF. MAY: There's a lot of stuff and if we
19	know that, then it's possible you're not going to
20	know that or probably the people who are making the
21	choices and block the matter out, but there might be
22	some way in which the laboratory or other committee
23	that reviews this stuff I don't know which things
24	they ought to look at label that this is exempted
25	exempted under the nuclear weapons provision.

1	DR. GOLDBERG: Well, this is the kind of
2	subject that we should deal with when we have
3	representatives of the agencies and offices up here to
4	talk with us. With reference to our report, I think
5	we've got a pretty fair idea of what we're going to
6	include in it and what we should not include. I
7	suggest that the probably procedure ought to be to
8	draft such a report and send it out to members of the
9	panel for their review and comment. On the basis of
10	that, prepare a final report of which you'll also
11	receive a copy and submit that to Secretary Page.
12	I think we have a long way to go here before
13	we can make more specific suggestions that I think have
14	been agreed on for inclusion in this report this
15	first report. This is a first report. It seems to me
16	that it ought to be in general terms. I think we have
17	highlighted the specific instances or specific items
18	that we think ought to be included in it, namely the
19	need for more resources to see to it that something
20	effective comes out of all this; the desire of the
21	panel for more information to be gotten initially
22	directly from representatives of the services and some
23	of the agencies appearing here at our next meeting
24	perhaps and giving us this kind of information; the
25	where we'd like to see the emphasis placed the

1	particular offices which we've already mentioned
2	several times that ought to have priority.
3	I think that would probably be sufficient for
4	our first that in the future we would like to go
5	beyond this; take some additional steps; to specify
6	areas that we think ought to be given priority for
7	declassification. And beyond that, perhaps specify
8	particular files, series, that ought to be given
9	priority if we if and how we can determine it from
10	the declassification plans.
11	Now, what more would you like to see included
12	in this report? Sounds good. If that satisfies you,
13	if you think that's enough for an initial step, then
14	that's how we will proceed. We'll draft a report, see
15	that you get a copy of it. Make your comments into
16	consideration and send out the final. We will I'll
17	try to homogenize it to everybody's satisfaction
18	possibility, of course, but I will try, and I hope that
19	you will give me your best thoughts on the subject.
20	Language can sometimes be important in a report of this
21	kind and you can help improve both language and the
22	thought, it would be very much appreciated.
23	Is there anything else anyone would like to
24	bring up?
25	MR. BROWN: (inaudible) member of the panel

1	in the meeting here to come over to the Navy Yard and
2	sit down and talk to us, give you some insight to the
3	Navy declassification plan. Sit down and talk with us
4	about elements of the plan.
5	DR. GOLDBERG: Yes, I think something we can
6	do for the panel members is probably give you a list of
7	the people in the services and the other agencies who
8	are concerned, who are responsible for the
9	declassification security. That might help if you want
10	to make any further connections with them. I think we
11	can do that, can't we? Yes. Alright, if there's
12	nothing else, we stand adjourned. Thank you.
13	(Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m. the meeting in the
14	above captioned matter was concluded.)